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Democratic experimentalism, the procedural component of the “new governance” movement, has won widespread acceptance in calling for decentralization, deliberation, deregulation, and experimentation. Democratic experimentalists claim that this approach offers pragmatic solutions to social problems.
Although the democratic experimentalist movement formally began only a
decade ago, antipoverty law has reflected its major principles since the 1960s.
This experiment has gone badly, weakening antipoverty programs. Key elements of this participatory approach to antipoverty law—decentralization, privatization, and the substitution of ad hoc problemsolving for individual
rights—all contributed to the calamity that low-income people suffered during
and after Hurricane Katrina. Those same features prevented the country from
acting on the widely shared concern about poverty in Katrina’s wake. Indeed,
almost all progress in antipoverty law has come from centralized, nonparticipatory, and non-experimentalist policymaking.
Democratic experimentalism assumes consensus on the nature of problems
and the propriety of government action, reliable metrics for measuring success,
the luxury of time, the lack of situations requiring centralized policymaking,
and deliberation that is costless in most respects. It also requires that one side
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risk political capital to establish an experimentalist system. These assumptions
have not been fulfilled in antipoverty law. Little suggests that they will be met
in other fields either.
Further progress in antipoverty law must come from centralized policymaking based on substantive consensus among many, though not all, liberals and
conservatives. This consensus will follow many substantive components of the
new governance, including reliance on market incentives. Democratic experimentalism should learn from debates about deliberative democratic theory that
have wrestled with its key weaknesses.
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INTRODUCTION
Few could ask for a call for justice more passionate than President
Bush’s speech from Jackson Square after Hurricane Katrina:
“[P]overty has roots in a history of racial discrimination, which cut off
generations from the opportunity of America,” he said. “We have a
duty to confront this poverty with bold action. . . . [L]et us rise above
1
the legacy of inequality.” Later that month, the President joined
many others in deeming Katrina a wake-up call for the country on
poverty: “What a lot of Americans saw was . . . poverty that they had
never imagined before. . . . Poverty is . . . an important issue, . . . and it
2
needs to be addressed in a significant way.” Similarly, Business Week
declared that “[i]f U.S. political leaders continue to concentrate on
shoring up the finances of the country’s wealthiest citizens and shred3
ding the poor’s safety net, the poverty rate will spiral higher.” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice insisted “that race and poverty are a
4
huge problem in the United States, and we’ve got to deal with that.”
Republican activists encouraged the President to “confront the issue
of poverty ‘with bold action’ . . . to lead the party back to [the] great-

1

Address to the Nation on Hurricane Katrina Recovery from New Orleans, Louisiana, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1405, 1407 (Sept. 15, 2005).
2
Remarks at the Department of Energy and an Exchange with Reporters, 41
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1461, 1463 (Sept. 26, 2005).
3
Christopher Farrell, Poverty: The Crisis Katrina Revealed, BUS. WK., Sept. 27, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/sep2005/nf20050927_0544_db013.htm
(last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
4
Rice: Disaster Shows ‘Ugly Way’ Race, Poverty Collide, CNN.COM, http://www.cnn.com/
2005/POLITICS/09/13/katrina.rice/index.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
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5

ness” it had under Lincoln. Finally, as if on cue, the day after Katrina
hit the Gulf Coast, the Census Bureau reported that poverty had in6
creased for the fourth consecutive year. The nation seemed poised
for action.
It was not to be. Not only did the country fail to take any new initiatives to address poverty generally, it largely abandoned for a second
time the same disaster victims that had already suffered so grievously
from the slow response by the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA). These victims were scattered to unfamiliar cities, warehoused in isolated trailer camps, and often prevented from
returning to their communities. Largely bipartisan bills offering
7
sweeping relief to disaster victims died without floor action, and a few
months later, President Bush signed a tepid legislative response to the
disaster. The legislation largely excluded low-income people and provided sweeping cuts in Medicaid and new conditions on cash assis8
tance likely to drive most states to gut their programs. Although
much of the news media showed impressive staying power, other
events and controversies eventually pushed Katrina’s survivors from
5

Sophia A. Nelson, I’m Hoping Bush Can Finish What Lincoln Started, WASH. POST,
Oct. 23, 2005, at B3.
6
See Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health
Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2004, in CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: CONSUMER INCOME 9 (2005) (indicating a 12.7% poverty rate in 2004, up from 12.5% in
2003); Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2003, in CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: CONSUMER INCOME 1 (2004) (reporting an increase in the poverty rate and the number of
people in poverty between 2002 and 2003); Bernadette D. Proctor & Joseph Dalaker,
U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty in the United States: 2002, in CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: CONSUMER INCOME 1 (2003) (showing an increase in the poverty rate from
2001 to 2002); Bernadette D. Proctor & Joseph Dalaker, U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty in
the United States: 2001, in CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: CONSUMER INCOME 1
(2002) (showing an increase in the poverty rate from 2000 to 2001). To be sure, this
sentiment was not unanimous: a Heritage Foundation spokesman complained, “[i]t’s
a bit unfortunate to link the hurricane with the issue of poverty in this country.” Kelley
Beaucar Vlahos, Katrina Reveals Poverty Reality, FOXNEWS.COM, Sept. 11, 2005,
http://foxnews.com/story/0,2933,168842,00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
7
See, e.g., S. 1716, 109th Cong. (2005) (detailing would-be Medicaid, Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and unemployment compensation benefits for
displaced people).
8
See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, tit. VI, 120 Stat. 4, 54-134
(2006) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (making wide-ranging cuts in the
Medicaid program). The Medicaid and related cuts alone were twelve times larger
than the cost of disaster relief. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: S. 1932
DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005, at 35 (2006) (explaining that Katrina-related spending would total $2.2 billion in 2006 but that direct spending on Medicaid would decrease $26.4 billion between 2006 and 2015).
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the headlines. Coverage of the Hurricane’s second anniversary almost
unanimously painted a picture of governmental failure and continued
hardship for victims.
Cynics may question the sincerity of some of those who flocked to
the antipoverty banner. That explanation, however, is plainly insufficient: the public’s outpouring of concern was so broad and intense
that even insincere politicians should have found it advantageous to
be swept along.
For most of the last quarter-century, beginning with President
Reagan’s deep cuts in public-benefit programs, activists have assumed
that weak public support was the main obstacle to more robust anti9
poverty laws. The absence of any meaningful assault on poverty in the
wake of Katrina suggests a more fundamental, structural problem with
the dominant model of antipoverty lawmaking that this country has
adopted. The decentralized, participatory, and deliberative approach
the United States has relied upon to design antipoverty policies over
the past four decades has prevented it from developing, and mobilizing supporters around, a coherent, plausible proposal. We have
grossly overestimated the value of deliberation and underestimated the
importance of achieving a meaningful consensus about the substantive
principles of antipoverty law. Indeed, all substantial advances in antipoverty law that we have achieved are attributable to a second track of
centralized, substantive, pragmatic policymaking on low-salience issues.
This critique of decentralized, participatory decision making goes
against the grain of contemporary legal scholarship. Cass Sunstein,
for example, has extolled the virtues of minimalism, defined as resolving policy questions on the narrowest possible grounds without seek10
ing a broader substantive consensus.
He urges “promot[ing] the
democratic ideals of participation, deliberation, and responsiveness”
11
and “leav[ing] fundamental issues undecided.”
Even more prominently, democratic experimentalists have called
for very much the same approach to policymaking that antipoverty law

9

See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 65-67 (2d
ed. 1995) (arguing that focused public attention is a prerequisite to significant political
change); David A. Super, The New Moralizers: Transforming the Conservative Legal Agenda,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 2032, 2040 (2004) [hereinafter Super, New Moralizers] (arguing
that public sentiment in fact has been far more evenly balanced than is commonly
thought).
10
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT ix-xiv (1999).
11
Id. at x.
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has taken for at least the past four decades: decentralizing authority,
broadening participation in policymaking, expanding reliance on the
private sector, basing future policies on what experiments have found
12
to be successful, and rejecting substantive individual rights. In essence, the dominant approach to antipoverty law over at least the last
four decades has been an experiment in democratic experimentalism.
To be sure, the development of antipoverty law has not followed all of
the choreographed moves described in democratic experimentalist
theory—it certainly has not produced the salutary results that theory
envisions. Nonetheless, its embrace of many major democratic experimentalist principles can provide valuable insight on their potential and limitations.
A major obstacle to systematic evaluation of democratic experimentalism has been its presumed novelty. If few examples exist so far,
we have no choice but to accept the case studies that the theory’s proponents identify to demonstrate its potential. In that case, a fair assessment of democratic experimentalism’s likely outcomes would have
to await its implementation on a wide enough scale to allow unbiased
sampling. Moreover, the relative newness of the democratic experimentalists’ hand-picked examples prevents examination of their durability over time. As a result, recognizing that antipoverty law has
embraced the major tenets of democratic experimentalism for several
decades can provide the means to assess whether this is the right path
for antipoverty law and to question democratic experimentalism’s
prospects.
The deliberative approach to antipoverty law has displayed several
major shortcomings. First, it has obstructed resolution of fundamental normative disagreements about society’s responsibility to lowincome people. Instead of establishing local processes to search for
non-ideological answers that work, it has sustained the most extreme
positions on both the Left and the Right even after it became clear
that neither side could prevail in national policy debates.
Second, proceduralism has insufficiently broad normative appeal
to defend antipoverty efforts against their critics: those seeking sav-

12

See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 283-89 (1998) (detailing democratic experimentalists’
approach to policymaking). To be fair, the democratic experimentalists insist that the
1996 welfare law does not conform to their vision. This Article contends that the welfare law, and the prior history of antipoverty law, fail to conform to their vision precisely because the democratic experimentalist assumptions are not met in this field—
and because of the absence of means to respond to the failure of those assumptions.
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ings to fund tax cuts or deficit reduction will not be satisfied with a
round of community meetings. A regime that dissipates efforts to improve antipoverty programs while allowing cuts to sail through unimpeded creates a one-way ratchet that will lead to steady erosion of
these programs.
Third, the lack of a meaningful consensus about the substantive
goals of antipoverty law prevents coherent evaluation of the results of
policy experiments: without an agreed-upon set of goals, we cannot
agree on what “works” to accomplish them. Moreover, latent ideological disagreements have led to tendentious selection and interpretation of various metrics.
Fourth, deliberative models require relatively continuous engagement. That continuousness squanders the intense but intermittent activity that can drive progress on behalf of marginalized groups
such as low-income people. Most major changes in antipoverty policy
result from large external shocks that briefly focus attention on these
13
problems and programs.
Fifth, decentralization places responsibility on government actors
that lack the fiscal capacity to respond effectively. The effects of this
misallocation of responsibility are magnified because the very economic downturns that increase the prevalence and depth of poverty
14
also shrink state and local governments’ revenues. Moreover, lowincome people’s mobility allows irresponsible localities to free-ride on
other localities’ programs. And Congress resists increasing federal
15
contributions for fear that they will induce states to reduce their own.
Sixth, decentralized deliberation comes with high transaction
costs. This favors those with greater resources bear the costs of participating in ongoing debates. Ideologues seeking to make expressive
points on both the Right and the Left may have those resources, but
16
low-income people and their closest allies rarely will.
13

See DOUGLAS R. IMIG, POVERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF
POOR AMERICANS 25-26 (1996) (arguing that important social-welfare policies can
develop from episodic reform movements).
14
See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2629-40
(2005) [hereinafter Super, Fiscal Federalism] (discussing the interrelation between
business cycles and state spending programs).
15
See PAUL E. PETERSON & MARK C. ROM, WELFARE MAGNETS: A NEW CASE FOR A
NATIONAL STANDARD 100-01 (1990) (noting that some supporters of increasing federal
funding in the early Aid to Dependent Children program sought assurances that states
would not respond by reducing their own spending).
16
This problem closely relates to the feminist critique of the Alternative Dispute
Resolution movement for creating a highly discretionary system that magnifies, rather
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Finally, seeking to establish a participatory, experimentalist policymaking process consumes the scarce political capital of antipoverty
advocates. Given this country’s already-tepid commitment to fighting
poverty, that is an extravagance low-income people can ill afford.
Some of these difficulties may be peculiar to antipoverty law.
Nonetheless, they sufficiently parallel other areas of public policy to
warrant a broader reexamination of the conditions under which democratic experimentalism and similar procedural models can be applied beneficially. In short, accounts of democratic experimentalism
to date have suffered from a single-minded focus on the regime it
seeks to establish, disregarding both the ways in which that regime
could be corrupted and the pitfalls awaiting those seeking to establish
such a system. An experimentalist movement should be tested in just
this way: by examining actual experiences rather than accepting un17
tested generalizations.
Part I separates the “new governance” into its substantive and procedural components. The substantive element seeks to replace command-and-control regulation with market-based incentives. The procedural element is democratic experimentalism. Through a careful
reading of prominent works on democratic experimentalism, this Part
discerns the crucial assumptions underlying that theory, considers the
consequences of violating those assumptions, and addresses the process by which such a regime might be installed. It also identifies some
ethical considerations that may limit the range of democratic experimentalism’s legitimate application.
Part II sketches the deliberative model of antipoverty law. Three
decades before the democratic experimentalists rebelled against the
New Deal paradigm of expert regulation, participants in the War on
Poverty were doing precisely the same thing. Authority devolved to
local communities, which were required to adopt inclusive delibera18
tive processes and encouraged to innovate. Ideological stalemates at
the national level helped maintain and expand decentralized, experimentalist policymaking on high-salience issues. At the same time,
however, centralized policymaking continued on low-salience issues
and programs, incrementally and non-ideologically achieving virtually
than dissipates, the effects of gender hierarchy. ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 7779 (1997).
17
“Experimentalism would be superfluous if its results could be anticipated by reflection.” Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 407.
18
SAR A. LEVITAN, THE GREAT SOCIETY’S POOR LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO POVERTY 109-31 (1969).
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all of the meaningful progress that occurred. The commitment to decentralized deliberation on high-salience issues did not block major
19
initiatives to dismantle antipoverty programs in the early 1980s and
20
the mid-1990s. It did, however, effectively prevent this country from
translating its empathy for Katrina’s victims into meaningful action.
Part III explores the potential of the alternative, substantive model
of antipoverty law. It argues that a more proactive approach to fighting poverty would strengthen low-income communities during crises
and normal times alike.
Part IV then considers what scope is appropriate for democratic
experimentalism in light of these concerns, seeking insight from political theory’s debates over deliberative democracy.
I. DISAGGREGATING DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM
The “new governance” is a moniker that brings together some
21
quite disparate substantive and procedural impulses. Substantively,
new governance rejects rigid command-and-control regulation in favor of the flexible manipulation of incentives to motivate socially de22
sirable behavior. More broadly, it rejects much of the existing regulatory state and seeks to destabilize it in the hope that something
better will replace it. Its procedural prescriptions, commonly termed
democratic experimentalism, seek to implement, but are analytically
23
distinct from, those substantive aims. Democratic experimentalism

19

MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
WELFARE IN AMERICA 285-89 (1986) [hereinafter KATZ, POORHOUSE].
20
MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 317-28 (2001) [hereinafter KATZ, CITIZENSHIP].
21
See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 345-47 (2004) [hereinafter Lobel,
Renew Deal] (setting forth the many different legal theories that comprise the new governance model). See generally Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12 (presenting democratic experimentalism as one new form of government that decentralizes power but also requires local information sharing).
22
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 350-54 (extolling agencies’ rolling bestpractice rulemaking methods); Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 357-58 (arguing
that a “central control-and-command structure [is] impossible” in the modern state);
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1019 (2004) (asserting a recent shift away from command-and-control regulation toward experimentalist intervention).
23
Some new-governance scholars, however, seek to blend these substantive and
procedural elements. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Response, “New Governance” in
Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89
MINN. L. REV. 471, 474 (2004) (describing new governance as aspiring to be “open-
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would shift regulatory authority to state and local governments, and
25
often to the private sector as well. It would then task them with establishing a highly participatory method of policymaking, designed to
assimilate as much local expertise as possible, in preference to repre26
sentative democracy. Experimentalism would strip central authorities of most responsibilities other than gathering and disseminating
27
information on local initiatives to enrich this deliberation.
The democratic experimentalists’ critique of the extant regulatory
28
regime is similarly bifurcated. To support their substantive agenda,
they rely upon what is essentially the standard economic argument
about deadweight losses resulting from command-and-control regula29
tion, particularly when regulation ignores important factors affecting
30
the costs and benefits of compliance. To support their procedural
prescriptions, experimentalists assert that federal regulators produce
additional inefficiencies because they are overwhelmed by their tasks,
31
buffeted by the conflicting agendas of the political branches, and
32
33
operating on insufficient information, especially local information.
textured, participatory, bottom-up, consensus-oriented, contextual, flexible, integrative, and pragmatic”).
24
See Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 381 (describing the Renew Deal as advocating a movement of power and responsibility downward to states and outward to the
private sector).
25
See id. at 381, 396 (“Renew Deal governance scholarship stresses the importance
of capacity building of private actors.”).
26
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 328-32 (espousing community policing as an
effective, localized, participatory method of policymaking); Sabel & Simon, supra note
22, at 1067-68 (describing the experimentalist tendency to admit interest groups to the
negotiation process). Although democratic experimentalists insist that their program
is one of “direct deliberation,” Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 340, and disparage representative democracy, their examples often feature dialogue among representatives
(albeit unelected ones) of various interest groups rather than among the citizenry itself.
See id. at 324-27 (describing the experimentalist reform of family support services).
27
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 338-39 (illustrating the need for national institutions to coordinate information sharing in democratic experimentalist models).
28
Here again, some blend the elements of the substantive and procedural regimes
experimentalists reject. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 23, at 474 (criticizing “fixity,
state-centrism, hierarchy, excessive reliance on bureaucratic expertise, and intrusive
prescription”).
29
See Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 364-65, 388-89 (suggesting that implementing policy in a top-down model is sometimes nearly impossible due to political
weakness or ideological resistance); Sabel & Simon, supra note 22, at 1061-62.
30
See Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 394.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 444.
33
See, e.g., id. at 420 (suggesting challenges that a centralized system might face,
because of regional variance in norms, in combating employment discrimination on
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They deride assertions of individual substantive rights as producing
34
“more disorder.” The democratic experimentalists further suggest
that the high transaction costs in the current system—ongoing con35
flict—result from uninformed policymaking. To oversimplify slightly,
they suggest that we can move quickly from a Hobbesian state of nature to a Tocquevillian community of civic virtue through partial decentralization of regulation.
Much of the academic community’s acceptance of the new governance can be traced to its ability to offer something to people at
many different points on the political spectrum. For business interests, it heralds less onerous regulation; indeed, for those business interests unreconciled to regulation, it moves authority to smaller agencies that are easier to influence or defeat. Those who tend to equate
the private sector with efficiency can appreciate the promise of new
governance to translate advances in industrial organization to political
organization. For critics decrying federal agencies’ vulnerability to
“capture,” new governance shrinks agencies’ roles in order to reduce
36
the appeal of suborning them. To conservative deregulators and decentralizers, it presents an opportunity to broaden their support at the
cost of allowing some inexpensive information gathering by federal
37
agencies. For similar reasons, moderates fatigued with ideological
warfare may see it as an attractive compromise, an “optimistic” mar38
riage “drawing together elements from rival schools of thought” :

the local level); see also Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 279 (asserting that the centralized New Deal bureaucracy lacked access to useful information gathering).
34
Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 279 (criticizing legislation establishing individual
rights as checks on bureaucratic excesses). Remarkably, they suggest that the success
of individuals’ claims of constitutional and statutory violations would depend in part
on whether the plaintiffs could show that other locales had found effective ways to implement the same program without such violations, id. at 288, 398-404, and that individuals could vindicate their constitutional rights against infringements designated
“experiments” only upon showing that those experiments were shams, id. at 464.
35
See Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 378-79 (praising local information sharing conducted by collaborative programs).
36
Sabel & Simon, supra note 22, at 1064-65 (describing different patterns of political influence); see also Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 278 (discussing the dynamic of
agency capture).
37
Lobel reports that conservatives routinely take advantage of progressives’ embrace of localism and democratic participation by “subvert[ing] the ideals of progressive social reform and replac[ing] them with conservative agendas that reject egalitarian views of social provision.” Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical
Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 972 (2007) [hereinafter Lobel, Paradox].
38
Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 442.
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conservative demands to dismantle the federal regulatory state with
39
continued espousal of progressive social aims.
Some progressives have such broad faith in human nature that
they are inclined to blame imperfections in our democratic structures
or information failures for policies they dislike; democratic experimentalism features more, broader deliberation and a new source of
information (mediated, in all likelihood, by liberal social scientists).
Other progressives have centralizing impulses learned from the New
Deal and the civil rights movement and are dismayed at conservatives’
40
success in recent years at devolution and deregulation ; for them, the
41
new governance promises to turn lemons into lemonade. Still other
progressives fear that globalization magnifies business interests’ power
and imperils hard-won social gains; democratic experimentalism shifts
42
the focus decisively to the local, with the expectation that some intervention will occur. For them, democratic experimentalism offers
the means to justify appealing state and local actions in the federal
43
government’s traditional domain. Some also applaud its efforts to
44
jettison judicial review. And for anyone of any stripe who is unhappy
with the current state of national politics, democratic experimentalism
45
dangles the prospect of starting over.
This Part takes a more dispassionate look at the procedural side of
the new governance. Section A parses the assumptions underlying

39

See id. at 344 (suggesting that the new governance model allows for “renewed
dialogue between those who champion centralized top-down regulation and those who
advocate devolution, deregulation, and privatization”).
40
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 271-72 (acknowledging inefficiency and “freewheeling delegation of interpretive authority” among other criticisms of the new
federalism).
41
It also stakes out a continued role for central government, albeit a small one,
that may prove relatively uncontroversial with the Right. Id. at 338-39.
42
Refuting the popular slogan, democratic experimentalism tells us that we need
not think globally to act locally.
43
See, e.g., Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 245-48 (2001)
(describing the role of state and local governments in bypassing the federal government to advocate for international human rights).
44
See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rightsand Democracy-Based Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 813, 822-24 (2003) (highlighting
democratic experimentalism as one version of weak-form judicial review).
45
See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 22, at 1020 (conceptualizing experimentalist
public-law litigation as the right to break up settled bureaucratic patterns); see also
Jeanne C. Fromer, An Exercise in Line-Drawing: Deriving and Measuring Fairness in Redistricting, 93 GEO. L.J. 1547, 1551 (2005) (describing how democratic experimentalists
would analyze and suggest changes in redistricting schemes).
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democratic experimentalism. Section B considers the consequences
when conditions violate those assumptions. Section C examines the
difficulties of establishing democratic experimentalist regimes. Finally, section D identifies some ethical issues affecting democratic experimentalism’s application to laws specifically affecting vulnerable
people.
A. Key Assumptions Underlying Democratic Experimentalism
Six crucial assumptions are implicit in democratic experimental46
ism. First, invoking the metaphor of a business firm whose many
47
units work cooperatively toward a common goal, it assumes a general
48
consensus about the existence and nature of a problem. Although
its champions insist that their proposal does not “rest on deep prior
49
consensus,” the business corporations to which they analogize do
have such a consensus on a goal: maximizing value for shareholders.
The “problem” of producing and selling widgets comes to light when

46

Some of the new governance’s substantive precepts also depend on important
and sensitive assumptions. For example, Dorf and Sabel insist that in a newgovernance regime, a company that developed new environmental or health and safety
technologies would share them with its competitors, but the authors do not explain
how that regime would change incentives or intellectual property law to secure that
cooperation. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 351-52. Dorf and Sabel also assume that
companies would want to avoid being the lowest environmental or health-and-safety
performers enough to invest in substantial improvements, yet they specify neither
regulatory penalties nor market incentives that would motivate those investments. Id.
at 353.
47
Id. at 286-87, 444 (focusing on the “delivery of services analogous, if not identical, to those provided by private-sector firms”). But see id. at 444-69 (applying the same
methods to the “delivery” of individual rights, such as freedom of speech, equal protection, and the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination).
48
This assumption is quite remarkable given the democratic experimentalists’
embrace of a pragmatic worldview in which no agreement exists as to first principles.
Id. at 284-86. The democratic experimentalists do acknowledge that different locales
may have different “initial understandings of problems,” but they seem to assume that
these differences are descriptive, not normative. Id. at 287. Experimentalists also report that law enforcement preferred defiance over embracing the Court’s invitation to
experimentation with procedural safeguards in the wake of Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 467 (1966). Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 460. By contrast, scholars focusing more on the new governance’s substantive program candidly admit that experimentalism sometimes is little more than an attempt to make virtue out of necessity
when powerful interests block legislation that would compel them to change. See Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 395-96.
49
Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 321-22 (asserting that decisions in democratic
experimentalist regimes do not rely on consensus any more than in pragmatist business firms).
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the firm determines that doing so will be profitable; the problem is
solved when the company reaches its most profitable level of production. Democratic experimentalists thus assume away much of the
50
normative content of government. They acknowledge that views of
the problem may evolve in response to what communities learn about
51
the effectiveness of their own and other remedies, but they assume
that all parties agree on the ends of government. This assumption is
evident in narratives that begin at the point when a problem has been
52
ascertained and in accounts of debate in which the relative success of
alternatives does not require parsing trade-offs among conflicting ob53
jectives. It also is implicit in the procedures that experimentalists
recommend, which offer those with an economic or ideological stake
54
in the status quo bounteous opportunities to stall. The only determined opposition that democratic experimentalists countenance is
against their procedural prescriptions—decentralization and de55
liberation —not against the goals of government policy.
Second, democratic experimentalism assumes that all relevant
players are inclined to act in a public-spirited way to correct that prob56
lem.
Democratic experimentalism assumes that both recalcitrant
57
perpetrators, opposed to any effective action, and opportunists, hoping to exploit the problem to divert regulation to serve their private

50

See Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 452-53 (explaining governmental decision making as a response to incentives and regulations).
51
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 288 (noting that the local participation and
information sharing that are a part of democratic experimentalism could lead to much
debate over the current political choices).
52
See id. (suggesting that localities be directed to “publicly declare their goals”).
53
See id. at 397-400 (arguing for a solely proceduralist version of judicial review).
54
See id. at 345 (noting the inevitable obstructions that any democratic experimentalist administration would face). In acknowledging the possibility of “deception,”
experimentalists insist that monitoring and information sharing provide a complete
response, id. at 287, implying that the consensus is so overwhelming that the few deceivers cannot survive exposure. Similarly, they concede that policymaking “often” will
be “paralyzed by the clash of interests,” but express faith that further dialogue can resolve any problem. Id. at 323; see also Sabel & Simon, supra note 22, at 1068 (acknowledging that some actors may resist dialogue but expressing faith that special masters
can convert the holdouts). This conclusion suggests that the clashing “interests” are
weak so that most interest holders will surrender rather than act to obstruct deliberative decision making.
55
Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 337-38. But see id. at 343-44 (assuming that all
candidates for local, state, and federal office will embrace experimentalism).
56
See id. at 288 (assuming that localities will broadly join “the experiment”).
57
Democratic experimentalists assume that interest groups breaking ranks will
doom any systematic obstructionism. Id. at 349.
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interests, will lack any significant traction in a democratic experi59
mentalist regime. If any such people do exist, democratic experimentalists assume activists to have the political power to “revers[e] the
burden of proof” and force the “government to prove” its effective60
ness. Here again, both exponents’ narratives—focusing on services
whose continuation they assume to be uncontroversial, such as educa61
62
tion and policing —and the vulnerability of their proposed proce63
dures to calculated abuse make this assumption evident. They express faith that dialogue “loosens the hold of interest by fitfully
darting, as it were, beyond its reach, thereby discovering solutions bit
by bit in the unfamiliar territory beyond the reach of bounded ration64
ality and habitual calculations of advantage.” Thus, once a problem
is identified, the responses that democratic experimentalism offers,
and the debates it envisions, involve only the means, not the norma65
tive ends, of governance.
58

Dorf and Sabel note that businesses sometimes co-opt government’s regulatory
powers to ruin competitors, but they fail to explain why requiring a statement of reasons in a deliberative forum offers any better protection than having the same reasons
presented to a court. Id. at 392-93. Similarly, Lobel celebrates the Workforce Investment Act’s involvement of local businesses in determining what skills training will be
provided in a community without considering the possibility that employers on the
boards that will oversee the training programs will seek to lower their labor costs by
creating a glut of workers capable of doing work in those employers’ industries. Lobel,
Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 412-14.
59
On the other hand, self-interested behavior, such as “gam[ing] the rules,” capture of administrative agencies, and manipulation of legislative history, plays a prominent part in their critique of the old regime. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 278-79.
60
Id. at 348. The democratic experimentalists also assume that courts will consider obligations to participate sincerely in program evaluation and deliberative decision making sufficiently specific to be judicially enforceable. Id. at 349.
61
James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined:
The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 183 (2003) (arguing that the decentralization of public schools is a positive
development).
62
Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 317-18. Dorf and Sabel mention some more controversial governmental functions, such as public transportation, public housing, affirmative action, and redistribution of income, but they fail to acknowledge that some
have ideological commitments to abolishing those programs. Id. at 317-18, 398-99,
411-12. Even when discussing antipoverty programs, they assume that Congress is divided only about how to aid low-income people, not whether to do so. Id. at 341-42.
63
The exponents argue that any elite faction that attempts to stall will lose to a
coalition of other elites and the non-elite. Id. at 409-10.
64
Id. at 322.
65
Id. at 288. The democratic experimentalists suggest that the polity can change
the routines by which it accomplishes its ends, id. at 298-301, 319-21, but do not acknowledge the possibility that persistent, powerful, well-organized forces might prefer
no action.
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Third, democratic experimentalism assumes that reliable metrics
66
67
exist, and can be readily agreed upon and implemented, for measuring policies’ effectiveness. These metrics must produce reliable results relatively quickly so that the community may correct defective
policies. Without such metrics, local policy variations will be experiments in name only. This assumption obviously is linked to the preceding two: without an agreement on the nature of the problem and
the objectives of public action—including how to balance competing
objectives—no consensus metrics are possible. The experimentalists
concede that “[t]here are performance measures that notoriously conceal more than they reveal” and that insiders have an enormous ad68
vantage in selecting metrics.
They also assume that under69
performing localities will seek to avoid exposure. Additionally, they
note that “[m]any of those who participate in . . . ‘experiments’ will
70
do so in order to advance ideas they firmly hold, not to test them.”
Experimentalists assume, however, that all defective metrics are
71
opaque, rather than skewed, and hence readily recognizable.
Fourth, democratic experimentalism assumes that time does not
constrain decision making. On one hand, this means that decisions
are not urgent: no cost attaches to the time required to await the results of experiments in potentially slow-acting policies and the additional time subsequently required for deliberation. Were this not assumed, governments would need some means of comparing the costs
72
of delay with the potential benefits of greater insight. On the other
hand, this assumption also implies that localities can change policies
66

See id. at 345-48 (insisting that localities will ignore the desire to emphasize metrics that display them in a positive light for the common interest).
67
See id. at 341-42 (insisting that Congress will ignore its internal disagreements
over the merits of a certain end in order to enable experimentation).
68
Id. at 348.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 387.
71
See id. at 348-49 (predicting that local governments will provide accurate information due to pressure from other actors).
72
Dorf & Sabel’s selection of auto safety, id. at 357-65, as an example is thus surprising. Although the information gained from experiments might have been valuable, that value would have to have been purchased at the cost of additional avoidable
injuries and deaths on the roads. Particularly perplexing is the scathing criticism of
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S.
29 (1983), from advocates of data-based policymaking. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at
362-63. State Farm is one of the leading limitations on willful policymakers’ ability to
disregard evidence. Elsewhere, they declare that “the court’s task is to inquire whether
the agency in fact undertook the kind of information organizing and coordinating effort necessary” to make informed policy decisions. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 397.
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at will in response to evidence of success from other jurisdictions.
No policy choices could narrow future flexibility by, for example, reducing the government’s institutional capacity, depleting public cof74
fers, constructing buildings, or signing long-term contracts. Without
ongoing policy flexibility, reports of successes elsewhere would serve
only to enhance the frustration of policymakers and their constituents. The costs of a failed experiment thus are assumed to be limited
75
and manageable. This assumption also interacts with the assumptions of consensus over the nature and actionability of the problem: if
the norms of public policy were contested, delays in policymaking
could shift the balance of power.
Fifth, democratic experimentalism assumes the absence of factors
76
that would necessitate national regulation.
These include externalities from one state or locality’s actions that affect another state or
77
78
locality, agency problems, mobile entities’ ability to threaten ex79
80
its —and large entities’ capacity to bully directly —to bend state and
81
local governments to their will, costs beyond state and local govern-

73

See id. at 287 (implying that “error-correction” follows from “error-detection”).
Dorf and Sabel focus on the safety of nuclear power plant operations. Id. at
371-73. An experimentalist approach to nuclear plant design could leave some communities with reactors too dangerous to operate and too expensive to close.
75
Curiously, exponents of this view offer as an example safety rules designed to
protect construction workers from falling. Id. at 350. Construction workers seem
unlikely to welcome an experimentalist approach to finding the right standard. The
ethics of experimenting with these workers’ lives are suspect, to say the least.
76
See id. at 287 (“[N]ational measures can rarely address the particularities of local
experience . . . .”). But see id. at 413 (asserting that experimentalism may be adapted to
national policymaking). Democratic experimentalists do acknowledge that local governments lack the capacity to analyze possible solutions to their problems. Id. at 287.
They nonetheless believe that central dissemination of information fully remedies this
limitation. Id. at 287-88.
77
Experimentalists assume that each locality’s citizens can readily assess the full
value of its services. Id. at 288.
78
See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 61, at 188 (equating more localized control of
school systems with increases in schoolchildren’s well-being).
79
Dorf and Sabel cite air-pollution control as well suited to varying local regulation. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 396. They do not explain why emitters would not
locate in the jurisdictions with the most lenient regulations—or simply leverage the
threat of job losses if they relocate to ensure that their jurisdiction of choice adopts
agreeable rules. Id.
80
Id. at 408.
81
Id. at 277.
74
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82

ments’ capacity, and the burdens to businesses operating in multiple
jurisdictions of learning and complying with each set of require83
ments. To the extent that this assertion seems controversial, democratic experimentalism simply assumes that coherent national policymaking is impossible on the very sorts of highly complex issues com84
monly regarded as core to the federal government’s responsibilities.
To the extent that state and local governments lack the resources to
fund important activities, democratic experimentalism assumes Con85
gress will fund them to pursue broadly defined purposes. The “selflimit[ing]” members of Congress would bear the political costs of raising this revenue without the benefits of being able to point to particu86
lar activities they were supporting.
They would have to put their
87
“own disagreements to one side.”
Finally, democratic experimentalism assumes, for the most part,
that transaction costs do not significantly deter political participa88
tion. The one salient exception is information costs, which democratic experimentalists take to be effectively prohibitive absent the in89
terventions they propose. Yet while they doubt that members of the
82

They assume that acceptance of their procedural prescriptions will lead to adoption of their substantive recommendations, which in turn they assume to produce substantial savings. Id. at 412-13.
83
Cf. id. at 278 (noting the burdens on businesses of complying with different
regulatory regimes applicable to different sectors of the economy).
84
Id. at 270-71. The democratic experimentalists do acknowledge that the methods they espouse can be ineffectual in the corporate world when conditions demand
global decisions. Id. at 310-11.
85
Id. at 341-42. Dorf and Sabel assume redistribution will take place. Id. at 41112. Although they acknowledge that residential segregation leaves the localities where
many low-income people live without the resources to serve them, id. at 408, they are
unclear about whether the resources redistributed will come from federal, state, or
local government.
86
Id. at 342. Dorf and Sabel do note that, in passing the 1996 welfare law, Congress neither provided sufficient funds to states nor refrained from imposing onerous
regulations. Id. at 435-36.
87
Id. at 342. Indeed, the democratic experimentalists suggest that Congress
should pay for costly projects even when it prefers an inexpensive regulatory solution. Id.
88
See id. at 328-29 (responding to obstacles to participation by providing an example of a case in which they were overcome). But see Sabel & Simon, supra note 22, at
1064-66 (using public-choice concepts to explain “political blockages” that cause governmental misfeasance). Experimentalists do acknowledge the danger of “a morass of
proceduralism.” Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 405. They consider the possibility that
the costs of participation would give a comparative advantage to the affluent but dismiss the idea, citing serfs’ campaigns for freedom and freed slaves’ departure from
plantations. Id. at 408-11.
89
See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 61, at 266-67 (arguing that collective-action
problems hamper information collection).
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public will take the time to research a problem, the experimentalists
assume that the same individuals are happy to spend just as much
90
time in deliberations and other forms of community activism. They
assume these activists routinely attend “general meetings” with similarly inclined people from other parts of the country to compare
91
92
notes and have acquired the skills to do so effectively. Thus, after
taking a rationalist approach in adopting the neoclassical critique of
direct regulation, experimentalists reverse fields to reject the central
93
teachings of public-choice theory.
B. The Consequences of Failures in the Experimentalist Assumptions
The failure of these assumptions does not block the democratic
experimentalist program in its entirety; it merely renders the program
vulnerable to being sent radically off-course. Deregulation, decentralization, privatization, and even deliberation can still occur; they simply
fail to play the constructive roles the democratic experimentalists envision for them. Broader debates about deliberative democracy have
identified strong grounds for concern that the experimentalists’ assumptions often will prove to be unfounded in practice.
Without consensus about what the problem is or whether it is a
desirable object of state intervention, nothing is likely to replace the

90

Thus, for example, experimentalists assume that transparency in the interactions between regulators and regulated entities will automatically eliminate any risk of
capture. Cf. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 355 (discussing the adoption of
“[i]nspection by peer administrators” as a “higher-order error detection”). This implies that, should corruption occur, activists can smite it with certainty. Orly Lobel,
who has called the new governance an “analytical tour de force,” Lobel, Renew Deal,
supra note 21, at 343, nonetheless criticizes a “myth of engagement [that] obscures the
actual lack of change being produced.” Lobel, Paradox, supra note 37, at 985.
91
Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 348. Lobel suggests that new technology will facilitate participation, although her examples primarily involve reducing information
costs. See Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 438-41 (discussing “e-government,”
“e-rulemaking,” and “e-activism”). Others insist, however, that deliberations should be
conducted face-to-face. Sabel & Simon, supra note 22, at 1068.
92
But see Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 457 (acknowledging the need to develop participants’ skills).
93
They criticize public-choice theorists for “choos[ing] democracy over the Constitution” while complaining that “the democracy they describe does not merit the
name.” Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 273 (emphasis omitted). To support this criticism, Dorf and Sabel cite Frank Easterbrook, hardly a mainstream public-choice theorist. Id. at 273 n.11. Yet, elsewhere, democratic experimentalists rely on game and collective-action theory, two core tools of public choice. See id. at 352-53 (asserting that
traditional methods of pursuing product safety trigger “a game of chicken”); Lobel,
Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 445; Sabel & Simon, supra note 22, at 1065.
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centralized interventions dismantled in the experimentalist cause.
At best, the threat of blocking any meaningful new regime will allow
95
strong political interests to dictate terms to the weak. Much support
for devolution of authority turns out to be opportunistic, motivated by
a desire to eliminate public functions rather than to improve or de96
mocratize them.
Without reliable metrics, an attempt at experimentalism will only
97
shift policy debates from the normative to the empirical, probably
becoming even less accessible to technically unsophisticated voters in
98
the process. Alice Rivlin agrees that “the difficulty in selecting exemplary projects for publicity is that each one is unique. Nobody is
sure how relevant a successful program will be to other circumstances
99
and other areas.” Rivlin also notes that “[a]nother reservation about
the desirability of social experimentation concerns the honesty with
which experimental results will be reported. No one likes to fail.
Rightly or wrongly, the administrator of a successful experimental project will receive more acclaim and greater opportunities for advance-

94

See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (2006) (criticizing democratic experimentalist approaches in the employment-discrimination context for a lack of normative vision).
One experimentalist admits to “some ambiguity in the added value of generating synergy.” Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 384. She suggests that either greater empathy or greater ability to monitor one another may hold the answer. Id. at 384-85. Yet,
experience suggests that elites are unlikely to yield power and wealth to marginalized
groups absent a credible threat of greater losses. See ARCHON FUNG & ERIK OLIN
WRIGHT, DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 3-25 (2003) (“When individuals cannot dominate others . . .
they are often more willing to deliberate.”). Having to hire representatives to engage
in deliberations in which they never make meaningful concessions is not such a threat.
95
See Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 460-61 (discussing how informality in interactions is viewed by some scholars as “strategic powerlessness” which maintains “existing social hierarchies”).
96
See, e.g., TIMOTHY CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION: TWENTYFIVE YEARS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM 108-09 (1998) (“Reagan consistently defined federalism reform as a one-sided equation that reduced the federal role but did
little to encourage states and localities.” (citation omitted)).
97
See Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 455-56 (warning against “reliance on
technical formulae for value-driven policy choices”).
98
One leading new-governance scholar recognizes this risk: “New governance approaches often assume one-dimensional measurements in evaluating complex developments. For example, scholars may imply flat equations between advancement in
business administration models and new public management models; between scientific learning and democratic learning; between small-scale knowledge and large-scale
initiatives; and between accountability and responsiveness.” Id. at 450.
99
ALICE M. RIVLIN, SYSTEMATIC THINKING FOR SOCIAL ACTION 89 (1971).
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ment . . . .”
“Members of this implicit league of reformers may be
willing to gloss over one another’s overweening on the charitable
grounds that all experiments entail mistakes or out of the cynical expectation that should they encounter difficulties one hand will wash
101
the other.” If some types of social achievement are more difficult to
measure, the absence of measurable results may deny full consideration to proposals in those areas in subsequent experimentalist discussions. This denial violates the principle of political equality, an im102
portant precondition of democracy.
If one policy choice becomes effectively irrevocable, the experimentation will end prematurely, even if the results of that choice
prove unsatisfactory. Yet the provisionality that the democratic experimentalists celebrate also may become an obstacle to identifying
promising policies: “[S]ocial experiments may simply take too much
time. Many of the really interesting effects of social action show up
103
only after a period of years.”
These experiments may be ended
early, effectively excluding the policies being tested from further consideration in experimentalist deliberations. This, too, violates the
principle of political equality.
If only the national government can address a problem effectively,
all experiments are likely to “show” that the problem is not amenable
to a local response. This result could be misinterpreted as suggesting
that no public response on any level would be availing.
104
Finally, if participation proves costly, decentralization will move
decision making into greater obscurity, hidden from the scrutiny of
the national media and advocacy organizations that could spread
those costs more efficiently. Local voluntary participation proves ex-

100

Id. at 112.
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 874-75 (2000) [hereinafter Dorf & Sabel,
Treatment Courts].
102
See JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
DEMOCRATIC REFORM 30-31 (1991) (defining “political equality” as “the institutionalization of a system which grants equal consideration to everyone’s preferences and
which grants everyone appropriately equal opportunities to formulate preference on
the issues under consideration” (emphasis omitted)).
103
RIVLIN, supra note 99, at 117.
104
Failures of this assumption are likely to have a distributional skew: “[F]actors
that limit replication of successful coalitions among members of the middle and working classes, such as inadequate resources, leadership, and collective-action problems,
are even more problematic for the working poor . . . .” Frank Munger, Beyond Welfare
Reform: Can We Build a Local Welfare State?, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 999, 1018 (2004).
101
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traordinarily difficult to achieve on a broad scale.
Economic downturns and related cuts in government spending starve community
106
groups of funds at the very times when they are needed most.
Few
107
large foundations provide significant aid to community groups.
Community groups have been largely silent as the federal and state
108
governments enacted massive reductions in antipoverty programs.
As Pablo Eisenberg has explained, “[f]ar from leveling the playing
field, civil society appears to have acquiesced or, at worst, abetted a
national policy that has slowly made it more difficult for many citizens
109
to enjoy equal opportunities.”
Wealthy interests then will be bestequipped to fund and coordinate advocacy across a myriad of local
110
fora. A process that insists on achieving consensus will have particu111
larly high transaction costs, making it even easier for the affluent to
outlast the impoverished.
In regard to each of these risks, it should be noted that leading
democratic experimentalists disavow any resort to national authority
intervening where the experimental process has fallen apart: the only
112
remedies they envision from administrative agencies, Congress, or

105

See Pablo Eisenberg, Is it Time to End the Promise?: The Failed Volunteerism Crusade,
in CHALLENGES FOR NONPROFITS AND PHILANTHROPY: THE COURAGE TO CHANGE 165,
166-67 (Stacy Palmer ed., 2005) [hereinafter CHALLENGES] (discussing how a nonprofit organization, America’s Promise, failed to reach its lofty goals); FISHKIN, supra
note 102, at 54-58 (reporting low voter-turnout rates for American elections).
106
See Pablo Eisenberg, The Voluntary Sector in the 1970s: Problems and Challenges, in
CHALLENGES, supra note 105, at 23, 29-30 (finding that at the time when community
groups are most needed, they are “financially strapped”).
107
Id. at 32 (“Most [foundations] were not interested in community organizations . . . before the [Tax Reform] Act and have not changed their priorities since.”).
108
Pablo Eisenberg, Philanthropy Community Building, in CHALLENGES, supra note
105, at 126, 128-29 (noting that whenever Congress was considering whether to cut
programs that aided low-income people, organizations helping the poor said little in
protest).
109
Pablo Eisenberg, Looking Ahead: What is the Future for the Nonprofit World?, in
CHALLENGES, supra note 105, at 228, 236.
110
See Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 460-62 (“[S]tronger parties are able to
see the benefits of a shift to the governance model.”).
111
See FISHKIN, supra note 102, at 51 (stating that adopting the practices of a
Quaker meeting, where the discussion continues until a general consensus is reached,
would “raise decision-costs enormously”).
112
Administrative agencies would be research organizations, without substantive
decision-making authority. Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 399 (“[T]he business of
government agencies becomes regulatory research and development . . . .” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). One new-governance scholar breaks ranks with the purists
to acknowledge that “retention of supervisory authority and the background threat of
direct regulation and enforcement strengthen accountability in the shift to govern-
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the courts are directives to share information and deliberate.
Indeed, they declare it “most critical[]” to bar litigation outright while
experimentation—which they consider a perpetual process—is un114
derway.
Although democratic experimentalists describe ways that
parties might try to be persuasive in litigation over the breakdown of
115
deliberations, they so limit the court’s available remedies—at worst,
116
apparently, more deliberation —that it is unclear whether parties
would care if they won or lost.
In short, if the deliberative process cannot function effectively because any one of these assumptions is not met, democratic experimentalists provide no means to correct the malfunction. Here, the experimentalists depart significantly from the models of industrial organization that inspire them: if an employee or unit ceases to pursue the
general well-being of the corporation, or even if the employee or unit
does so zealously but ineffectually, senior management fires them. No
company would long remain profitable if it disabled the mechanisms
of central discipline as resolutely as the democratic experimentalists
propose.
C. How Democratic Experimentalist Regimes May Be Established
In addition to the system’s ongoing vulnerabilities, the process of
establishing democratic experimentalism in the first place may be
problematic. “Shifts from one paradigm to another are always about
shifts in power allocation. Governance processes not only provide a
framework for decision making and action, but also alternate the
117
power relations among the participants.”

ance,” but does not explain how to integrate this power with the radical devolution of
power at the core of the experimentalist program. Id. at 452.
113
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 349 (outlining the remedies that a legislature, an agency, or the courts could use in an experimentalist regime when confronted
with an actor who does not cooperate). Congress also apparently could withdraw research funding from a jurisdiction that refused to share information. Id. at 341. Lobel
suggests that greater “orchestration”—dialogue with interested parties and data collection—could remedy employers’ use of “cosmetic” antidiscrimination programs as
liability shields. Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 420-22.
114
Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 356.
115
Id. at 400-01, 464.
116
Id. at 389-90, 397-400.
117
Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 460; see also id. at 458 (finding it “irresponsible to discuss the shift from a state-centered regulatory model to a new governance
model based on collaboration and the empowerment of diverse actors without asking
who will win and who will—at least some of the time—lose”).

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

564

[Vol. 157: 541

Some scholars assert that the new paradigm can be established
118
“piecemeal,” but it remains unclear who would expend political
capital to establish a democratic experimentalist system. Advocating
for these procedures would divert resources away from each side’s advocacy for its substantive program. Significantly, this cost is unlikely to
be felt symmetrically; ironically, it will disadvantage groups with more
collaborative predispositions. Moralistic political cultures, which often have a liberal tint, are disproportionately likely to advance “public
119
interest” approaches to policymaking.
If the democratic experimentalists were not so scornful of publicchoice theory, they also might recognize that they have created a classic prisoner’s dilemma for the opposing sides of any public policy dispute. They may be right that having both sides collaborate on experimentalist problem solving is optimal for society as a whole, but each
side will be better off husbanding its resources to advance its substantive agenda, whatever its adversary may do. If one side is seeking an
experimentalist dialogue, aggressive substantive advocacy can allow
the other side to frame the issue decisively in its own terms; if the first
group is behaving aggressively, a similarly aggressive posture is necessary to avoid an adverse framing.
Democratic experimentalists respond that the potential for mutually utility-enhancing results from experimentalist collaboration differentiates this situation from a classic prisoner’s dilemma by making
120
mutual cooperation the optimal outcome for both sides.
The experimentalists offer no basis for believing that such solutions exist all,
121
most, or even a good deal of the time.
Moreover, even if an outcome that takes both sides’ interests into account maximizes total
value, deliberative processes are far from the only means to achieve
that result. Even in hard-nosed, thoroughly adversarial competition,
each side has an incentive to structure its demands so as to minimize
122
burdens on the other.
A single-minded environmentalist with no
118

See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 284 (noting that democratic experimentalism’s “adoption might be accomplished piecemeal by drawing on the available
precursors”).
119
PETERSON & ROM, supra note 15, at 39.
120
See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 322 (“[I]t is the very practical particularity of this deliberation . . . that advances the good of all participants.”).
121
Indeed, Lobel warns that “the governance model must not accept a naïve account of the win-win theme. Situations in which multiple interests are mutually enforcing are context specific.” Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 458.
122
Dorf and Sabel argue that including marginalized people in deliberations will
cause policymakers to begin to consider their interests. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at
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sympathy for industry might nonetheless prefer to reduce pollution
through efficient, market-based incentives rather than command-andcontrol standard setting because she recognizes that the vehemence
of industry opposition will depend on its expected losses: for any
given amount of political capital, she can win greater emissions reductions with a scheme that minimizes deadweight loss. She also might
calculate that market reliance will make her look more reasonable to
moderate policymakers lacking a firm commitment to either side.
An actor recognizing the value of an option that minimizes burdens on other players may nonetheless eschew cooperative, dialogic
policymaking processes for several reasons. First, she may seek to
avoid the transaction costs of such processes. Second, she may fear
that entering into cooperative processes will be interpreted as weakness by other players and lead them to raise their demands. Most
fundamentally, imposing the most efficient, socially wealthmaximizing option unilaterally will allow the actor to harvest the entire resulting surplus, whereas doing so collaboratively would force the
actor to share. The single-minded environmentalist described above
may try to achieve the greatest possible emissions reduction by imposing an incentive regime with a burden on industry comparable to the
most onerous command-and-control regime that is politically feasible.
If she entered into a collaborative process with industry, she presumably would have to purchase its consent by dividing the efficiency gains:
she would get emissions lower than under the command-and-control
regime but higher than she could have won from the political process.
Thus, even if the democratic experimentalists could show that alternative policies are always available that, by taking both (or all) sides’
needs into account, produce the best results for each, they would not
123
establish that deliberative processes are in all actors’ interests.
405. If marginalized people lack the power to defeat a final decision antithetical to
their interests, it is unclear why powerful groups would make concessions to them,
even if forced to talk. If formerly marginalized people do have political leverage, that
should affect the result, whether through dialogue or through other parties calibrating
their proposals to avoid a fight. Exponents passionately insist that the autonomy of the
formally powerless is vital to democratic experimentalism, but they do not explain how
that will be achieved. Id. at 405-06.
123
And even if experimentalists could somehow establish that mutual cooperation
produces the best result for all players, they cannot assure cooperation. More precisely, assuming that each side receives the best result from cooperating transforms the
game from a simple prisoner’s dilemma to an endlessly iterated prisoner’s dilemma.
Cooperation does indeed become the dominant strategy in this game, but players may
take different lengths of time to recognize that. The democratic experimentalists assume that uncertainty about the political situation will cause powerful interests to co-
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D. Ethical Concerns About Democratic Experimentalism
These practical problems associated with democratic experimentalism also help to illustrate an important set of ethical concerns. Insisting on experimentalist means to decide questions affecting vulnerable human beings, rather than favoring whichever method will yield
the best substantive results, comes perilously close to treating those
people as means rather than as ends. Although the democratic experimentalists are correct that the results of an experiment cannot be
124
known with certainty before it is conducted, some outcomes may be
far more probable than others. A strong argument could be made
that showing low-income people equal respect as human beings entails a duty to apply our best efforts to estimate experiments’ likely results and to proceed only with those likely to prove consistent with our
ethical beliefs. A series of tragedies in which those ethical concerns
125
were disregarded led to strict rules forbidding human experimentation without obtaining prior third-party ethical review and the fully in126
formed consent of the participants. Insisting upon experimentalist
policymaking when other means are more likely to secure vulnerable
people’s well-being risks repeating those mistakes.
A related concern involves the democratic experimentalists’ opposition to substantive individual rights. Although they do not provide
explicitly for any exceptions, many kinds of rights surely will not be
dropped. Property owners will not lose their rights against uncompensated takings even if they cannot identify “working alternatives
127
that do not.”
Courts will not ignore affluent political donors’ First
Amendment rights just because a locality has met its “obligation of
128
self-explication.”
The experimentalists’ discussion focuses largely

operate but fail to consider that it could do just the opposite. Id. at 409-10. In one of
Dorf and Sabel’s examples, a moderate policymaker, such as former Transportation
Secretary William Coleman, may seek to impose an experimentalist regime. Id. at 362.
As they demonstrate, however, such a regime is likely to prove unsustainable if one side
or the other seizes the reins of power. Id.
124
Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 407.
125
See generally Donald H.J. Hermann, Lessons Taught by Miss Evers’ Boys: The Inadequacy of Benevolence and the Need for Legal Protection of Human Subjects in Medical Research, 15 J.L. & HEALTH 147, 147-48 (2000) (noting historical instances of abuse of
medical research subjects).
126
42 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 300gg-92 (2000).
127
Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 288.
128
Id. at 399.
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on equal protection and regulatory statutes that protect individuals
129
against exercises of concentrated power.
Granting judicial protection to the substantive interests of one set
of actors and not those of another set has profound political consequences. Those whose key interests enjoy judicial protection can devote all of their political capital to pursuing secondary preferences
while their rightless counterparts can take nothing for granted. Having a judicially secured floor on one’s vulnerability to misfortune can
encourage political gambling that brings rich rewards; those who
could lose everything tend to hedge their bets more and are thus less
likely to win transformational change. Contemporary constitutionaland administrative-law doctrines already create considerable imbalances in recourse to the courts; exacerbating that imbalance will further hinder a deliberation of equals.
II. DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM AND ANTIPOVERTY LAW
In much of the world, antipoverty policy is primarily a matter for
the central government. Whether conducted through broad social
insurance, targeted need-based programs, subsidization of particular
industries or staples, or trade policies that promote export industries,
central officials almost invariably play a key role.
Not here. From its birth, this country has seen poverty as a local
concern to be addressed by local means. Moreover, our antipoverty
policy is profoundly heterodox. Our society as a whole is largely agnostic as to what substantively should be done, leaving state and local
antipoverty policymaking with broad scope. It optimistically valorizes
130
legislatures as addressing poverty “one step at a time.”
In addition, American antipoverty policy is highly participatory. It
offers individual low-income people the opportunity to participate in
determining the terms of their own relief through adversarial hear131
ings.
It finds participation in the project of relieving poverty ennobling and seeks to extend that participation as broadly as possible
through state and local governments and private charities.

129

Id. at 323-39, 356-64, 444-69; Brandon L. Garrett & James S. Liebman, Experimentalist Equal Protection, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 299-317 (2004).
130
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
131
See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10) (2006) (granting a “fair hearing and a prompt determination thereafter to any household aggrieved by the action of the State” regarding its food stamp program).
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This participatory model would seem tailor-made for democratic
experimentalism. Many of the most difficult tasks in establishing an
experimentalist regime—weaning the country from the centralized
regulatory system borne of the New Deal and encouraging broad participation—seemingly have already been accomplished. Antipoverty
policy thus would seem to provide an ideal arena in which to test democratic experimentalism.
Sadly, the participatory model of antipoverty law has been a resounding failure. This Part shows why. Section A traces the history of
the deliberative model of antipoverty law. It also identifies a
countermovement: a relatively obscure trend of centralized, largely
nonparticipatory policymaking that has been responsible for virtually
all progress against poverty despite being confined to low-salience issues of little interest to those engaged in the main experimentalist
project. Section B examines how diverse political constituencies combine to create these two tracks of antipoverty law.
A. The Deliberative Model of Antipoverty Law
Antipoverty law in this country always has been highly decentralized. For most of its history, caring for low-income people was almost
132
exclusively a local responsibility.
Apart from taking some tepid
133
measures to aid veterans, the federal government had minimal involvement until relief costs during the Great Depression threatened to
134
bankrupt local and even state governments.
Even then, the new
federal role was largely confined to financing: Congress regarded lowincome children as having insufficient ties to the national economy to
135
justify much federal involvement. It further dampened ambitions for
136
benevolent national leadership when it tightly capped grant levels. A
137
modest expert bureaucracy developed, but its powers were few.
Although not explicitly experimentalist, the law governing lowincome people also had strong scientific pretensions long before the
132

KATZ, POORHOUSE, supra note 19, at 3-88, 146-78.
Id. at 200-01.
134
Id. at 213-18.
135
See PETERSON & ROM, supra note 15, at 92-95 (detailing legislative history primarily concerned with providing benefits for retired lifelong workers and noting the
lack of representation for unemployed parents with dependent children).
136
Id. at 97.
137
See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 326 n.23 (1968) (noting that for almost a
decade federal officials had been criticizing to no avail the state practices that the
Court subsequently declared unlawful).
133
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New Deal. For example, the nineteenth-century “scientific charity”
movement split up low-income families and institutionalized their
members with the full support of some of the leading social scientists
138
of the day.
Program designers in different cities debated one another vigorously about whose approach to institutionalization was
139
best, seeking to convert other localities.
1. Decentralization, Deliberation, and Privatization in the 1960s
The War on Poverty changed far less than is commonly believed.
Because of President Johnson’s discomfort with addressing income
support directly, control of welfare—as well as the new food stamp
and Medicaid programs—remained heavily decentralized.
Moreover, the War on Poverty was founded on an emphatically
deliberative model. Its leading congressional champion insisted that
the “solution of the poverty problem is not possible without the full
140
participation of all elements of our society.” Its embrace of broader
participation in the 1960s was for very much the same reasons the
democratic experimentalists cite: a reaction against control of programs by New Deal–style professional elites, who were perceived as too
hidebound and insensitive to understand and meet low-income com141
munities’ needs. Even critics conceded that an emphasis on participation over substance in forming antipoverty policy seemed natural
for “a society increasingly concerned with the desiccation of the
community ties that lead men to accept and abide by the norms of
142
trust, integrity, and mutual aid.” A prominent feature of the War on
Poverty was the funding of agencies to increase low-income people’s

138

See HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR: THE UNDERCLASS AND ANPOLICY 47 (1995) (discussing how the scientific charity movement legitimated the concept of an “underclass” in order to justify punitive measures, such as institutionalization in prisons and mental hospitals, against the poor).
139
See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND
DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 180-86 (1971) (discussing various states’ approaches
to rehabilitating the poor and historical shifts in trends of institutionalization).
140
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, WAR ON POVERTY 171 (1964).
141
See DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING: COMMUNITY ACTION IN THE WAR ON POVERTY 64-70 (1969) (noting that President Kennedy’s
short-lived President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency illustrated the problematic
lack of beneficiary participations in “elite community leadership” programs); see also
IMIG, supra note 13, at 26-27 (describing the professionalization of antipoverty work
and its consequences).
142
MOYNIHAN, supra note 141, at 15.
TIPOVERTY
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143

participation in the political process.
From the outset, federal law
required these community-action agencies to proceed with “maximum
144
feasible participation” in setting priorities.
Soon after, however, the rise of the welfare-rights movement
145
changed the purpose of participation significantly.
In contrast to
the democratic experimentalists’ vision of deliberation as a search for
efficiency or the general good, the movement and its supporters saw
deliberative processes as opportunities to pursue the interests of those
most directly affected. Advocates of low-income people’s participation
in antipoverty programs saw benefits both to policy formulation and
to the development of skills and constructive habits for those partici146
pating. The Ford Foundation played a major role in bringing about
147
this change.
Paul N. Ylvisaker, director of the Foundation’s Public
Affairs Program, declared his goal was “to mobilize and individualize;
148
to gather power and liberate it.”
For a time, the direction of antipoverty policy was contested between the Ford Foundation, which advocated for a participatory model, and the Johnson administration,
149
which focused on substantive policies shaped by social science.
When the Vietnam War weakened and ultimately ended the Johnson
administration, the Ford Foundation was left in a position to imple150
ment its view.
The Left sharply criticized Johnson’s Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) for insufficiently involving low-income
151
people.
The increasing focus on self-interested advocacy affected

143

See ROBERT F. CLARK, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE SUCCESS: A HISTORY OF THE COMACTION PROGRAM 22 (2000) (describing legislation that required low-income
persons to make up at least one-third of the board of directors in community-action
agencies).
144
Id. at 55-57. These agencies still receive federal funding and are required to
involve low-income people in an annual priority-setting process. Id. at 22.
145
See WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE 344-45 (5th ed.
1994) (describing mass welfare-rights demonstrations, beginning in 1966).
146
See Lucie E. White, On the Vision and Practice of Participation in Project Head Start,
in LAW STORIES 197, 201 (Gary Bellow & Martha Minow eds., 1996) (discussing the
participation of parents in Head Start programs as a way of fostering parental involvement in their children’s education).
147
MOYNIHAN, supra note 141, at 38-43.
148
Id. at 39.
149
Id. at 76.
150
Id. at 4.
151
CLARK, supra note 143, at 108-09.
MUNITY
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the form of dialogue as well: community organizers stressed conflict,
152
not concord.
In keeping with the tenets of democratic experimentalism, an
early focus of the War on Poverty was improving the means of measur153
ing success and pressing local communities to “self-evaluate against
154
stated objectives.”
Federal officials “monitored local activities, conducted audits and periodically mounted full-scale evaluations . . .
155
[but] exercised little direct control over the actual expenditures.”
The empowerment movement soon, however, foundered on the
costs of participation. Other pressing concerns drew most recipients
away from welfare-rights organizations shortly after their own particu156
lar concerns were addressed. Ineffectual local welfare-rights leaders
became entrenched, with collective-action problems preventing their
157
displacement.
Many of the activist groups that formed to influence
the War on Poverty quickly “died from lack of leadership, goals or fi158
nancial nourishment.” Some of those that survived did so with government contracts or foundation grants, which often led their agen159
At a minimum, most groups lost the
das away from advocacy.
160
incentive to organize aggressively or to take controversial positions.
The movement also lost important allies. The decline of the most
activist stages of the civil rights movement saw a decline in acceptance

152

See TRATTNER, supra note 145, at 312 (citing criticism by well-known community
organizer Saul Alinsky in the 1950s).
153
See CLARK, supra note 143, at 78-82 (discussing the adoption of new poverty
thresholds as affecting the perspective and operations of aid programs).
154
Id. at 85.
155
Id. at 83.
156
See FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS:
WHY THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL 307-08 (Vintage Books 1979) (1977) [hereinafter
PIVEN & CLOWARD, MOVEMENTS] (discussing the lack of stable groups in attempts to
build welfare-rights organizations and the need to create new groups to maintain
membership rolls).
157
See id. at 309-10 (noting that those in leadership positions tended to focus more
on their incumbency than the goals of the movement itself and, thus, resisted new organizing efforts).
158
JAMES J. GRAHAM, THE ENEMIES OF THE POOR 271 (1970).
159
See IMIG, supra note 13, at 26-27 (arguing that such organizations historically
avoided political advocacy in order to focus on service provision); see also PIVEN &
CLOWARD, MOVEMENTS, supra note 156, at 321-26 (recognizing the weakened militancy
of the National Welfare Rights Organization as it relied more on the federal system).
160
See PIVEN & CLOWARD, MOVEMENTS, supra note 156, at 312-15 (noting that a
leadership agenda to cultivate relationships with other organizations led to changes in
rhetoric, but no incentives to act on them).
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161

of participatory policymaking.
For a time, the antipoverty movement made striking gains in transforming the professional bureaucracy it had set out to oppose. After initially fearing reform as a threat
to their profession, many social workers reconceptualized social
work’s ethics to require representing low-income clients’ chosen in162
terests.
Beginning in the late 1960s, however, states began to eliminate the professional bureaucracy, replacing social workers with nonprofessional technicians in the administration of public benefit pro163
grams.
Neither these “eligibility workers” nor the social workers—
installed in administrative roles or displaced away from antipoverty
164
work altogether—took strong roles in policy advocacy.
The crushing blow to empowerment, however, resulted from the
very delay inherent in deliberation. The time required to reach decisions left advocates under unrealistic pressure for quick results. One
participant ruefully noted that “[w]e constantly underestimate difficulties, overpromise results, and avoid any evidence of incompatibility
and conflict, thus repeatedly creating the conditions of failure out of a
165
desperate desire for success.”
Then, after antipoverty advocates
spent much of the War on Poverty’s first four years putting together a
deliberative process for deciding which battles to fight, they learned,
with the election of Richard Nixon, that the War was over.
The difficulties and delays that deliberation brought should not
be surprising. The goals of antipoverty policy have long been contro166
versial, even among those committed to helping low-income people.
Disillusioned participants have noted that deliberative approaches as167
sume common “good intentions” without specifying what they are.
Although many debates focus on the effectiveness of particular pro161

See id. at 331-32 (finding that the external resources on which the welfare-rights
movement had come to depend lasted only as long as the civil rights movement held a
strong mass base and ebbed away after the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and
the election of Richard Nixon).
162
See TRATTNER, supra note 145, at 312, 345. Some social workers even rejected
casework outright. Id.
163
Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and
Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1126-27 (2000).
164
See William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92
YALE L.J. 1198, 1254-67 (1983) (describing the conflicting interests between the working class and liberal reformers that doomed progressive advocacy).
165
MOYNIHAN, supra note 141, at xii-xiii.
166
For example, early voluntary antipoverty groups actively opposed governmentfunded relief efforts, advocating for psychological counseling instead. IMIG, supra note
13, at 27-28.
167
MOYNIHAN, supra note 141, at 39.
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grams, the ends of antipoverty policy are also controversial, with important leaders challenging the legitimacy of any public interven168
tion.
Many argued that economic forces would naturally eliminate
169
poverty. Later, the Reagan administration’s “master vision as to how
societies overcome poverty [was that] . . . [s]ocieties and people do it
on their own, and help from government is likely to do more harm
170
tha[n] good.”
And among those championing a public role, a divide emerged as to whether it should be a humanitarian effort to protect the neediest against severe deprivation or a broader effort to redistribute wealth that would also benefit those with modest means but
171
who were at no risk of doing without the basic necessities. To minimize controversy, President Johnson excluded income-assistance programs from the War until after his ability to enact legislation largely
had ended; local antipoverty agencies’ inability to address these basic
172
needs led to paralyzing debates in many communities.
As protracted deliberation robbed the War on Poverty of what dynamism it had, experimentalism, too, failed. In practice, voluntary
reporting systems faltered as local agencies found them burden173
some. Over time, the pressures to reduce government employment
as well as the demands of other tasks tend to shrink the staffing of
federal agencies assigned to monitor state and local agencies’ activities
174
under federal programs.
Congress’s commitment to experimentalism also proved weak: even when most local agencies perform well,
those with problems attract negative publicity, causing Congress to
175
tighten federal controls.
Even when rigorously evaluated local experiments showed promise of alleviating poverty, conservative critics

168

See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 143, at 62 (describing the views of Senators Barry
Goldwater and John Tower that the poor are responsible for their own condition); see
also TRATTNER, supra note 145, at 308-09 (describing efforts to roll back the New Deal’s
expansion of relief during the 1950s).
169
See TRATTNER, supra note 145, at 310 (pointing to John Kenneth Galbraith as
one such scholar).
170
Nathan Glazer, The Social Policy of the Reagan Administration, in THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT REVISITED: AIMS AND OUTCOMES OF PRESIDENT REAGAN’S SOCIAL WELFARE
POLICY 221, 236 (D. Lee Bawden ed., 1984).
171
MARTIN ANDERSON, WELFARE 68-73 (1978).
172
See FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE
FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 286 (1971) [hereinafter PIVEN & CLOWARD, REGULATING].
173
See CLARK, supra note 143, at 28.
174
See id. at 169 (describing a drop in the federal staff assigned to monitor the
Community Services Block Grant from 170 to 55 in just one year, with the remaining
staff absorbed into the Family Support Administration three years later).
175
Id. at 94-95, 111-13.
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raised sophisticated methodological questions about the reliability of
176
any results achieved on such a small scale.
Experimentalism was
equally a failure on the macro level. The War on Poverty began with
limited goals—the two strategies with the greatest potential to affect
low-income people directly, income support and job creation, were
excluded from the beginning—and a tiny fraction of the required
177
funding. It was “[l]ess a war on poverty than a minor skirmish.”
Nonetheless, the war was widely regarded as a failure, dooming major
178
state interventions in the future.
2. Deliberative Antipoverty Law Since the War on Poverty’s Demise
The deliberative model of antipoverty law did not die with the
War on Poverty. The value of participation was embedded both in law
and in the norms of activists. Antipoverty activists assumed that the
widespread sympathy toward low-income people achieved in the 1960s
would continue to provide a solid political grounding for the pro179
grams, allowing debate to proceed on questions of implementation.
Reducing policy debates to technical questions would make sense if a
sympathetic consensus remained; the great majority of the social sci180
entists that presumably would join in these deliberations were liberals.
The courts provided another impetus for a deliberative model.
Although unwilling to recognize substantive constitutional social181
welfare rights, the Supreme Court granted welfare recipients robust
rights to participate in deliberations about their cases in Goldberg v.
182
Kelly.
Assisting recipients in these deliberations proved an impor-

176

See ANDERSON, supra note 171, at 105-15 (cataloguing the types of biases that
might undermine the validity of social experiments).
177
TRATTNER, supra note 145, at 324.
178
Id. at 325.
179
See PHILIP S. LAND, SHAPING WELFARE CONSENSUS: U.S. CATHOLIC BISHOPS’
CONTRIBUTION 104-05 (1988) (describing a “positive consensus on welfare,” including
the proposition that “[w]elfare works but it does not produce miracles”).
180
See Super, New Moralizers, supra note 9, at 2089 (noting the liberals’ “broad consensus on a basic set of social values”).
181
See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972) (“So long as its judgments are rational, and not invidious, the legislature’s efforts to tackle the problems of
the poor and the needy are not subject to a constitutional straitjacket.”); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (“In the area of economics and social welfare, a
State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications
made by its laws are imperfect.”).
182
See 397 U.S. 254, 260-61 (1970) (holding that recipients of financial aid were
entitled to notice and a hearing prior to the termination of their benefits).
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tant recruiting opportunity for welfare-rights organizers. The Court
also handed down a series of cases aggressively interpreting publicwelfare statutes in favor of low-income people, implicitly inviting the
184
political process to engage in response. Like the strictly procedural
form of judicial review that the democratic experimentalists espouse,
the effectiveness of Goldberg and a regime of generous statutory interpretation assumes the independent presence of humane values and
185
depends on the power of deliberation. Without such values, legisla186
tors could reduce or eliminate the liberally construed programs,
eliminating the individualized determinations that give rise to the
187
right to deliberation. Like the truncated form of judicial review that
the experimentalists advocate, this approach gave low-income people
no substantive entitlements beyond those they could secure through
the deliberative process.
This participatory approach also proved convenient for another,
quite different reason: it provided a substitute for substantive agreement. As one leading conservative scholar noted,
[i]n the short run it might be possible to pass legislation that would institute a guaranteed income for all or, at the other extreme, simply eliminate all government welfare programs over a period of time and allow
private charitable efforts to take care of people in need. But neither of
these approaches will work unless preceded or accompanied by massive
188
changes in deeply held public beliefs.

Although this is true on the national level, decentralization gave
each ideological extreme the opportunity to search out areas where its
program could command a majority. As each side publicized its own
perceived successes and the perceived failures of policies it opposed,
this regime became experimentalist as well. This resort to decentral183

See PIVEN & CLOWARD, MOVEMENTS, supra note 156, at 297-98 (arguing that the
“objective of these activities” to address claimants’ grievances “was to expand membership affiliation”).
184
See, e.g., Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 258 (1974) (holding that standardized
allowances for work expenses must be adequate to cover all actual expenses).
185
See PIVEN & CLOWARD, REGULATING, supra note 172, at 306-14 (describing attempts to implement more procedural safeguards for denying welfare benefits in order
to decrease officials’ capriciousness).
186
See, e.g., Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 211 (1985) (finding that Congress
limited Shea in 1981 with the passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981).
187
See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 129-30 (1985) (holding that recipients have
no right to a Goldberg hearing when the state reduces or terminates their benefits en
masse as it implements new legislation).
188
ANDERSON, supra note 171, at 159.
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ized, participatory, and experimentalist decision making turned the
usual approach to deliberation on its head: instead of proceeding
from a shared set of values about the task to be accomplished, it re189
sulted precisely from the absence of such shared values.
a. Decentralization
Decentralization appeared to offer something appealing to each
side. As Donald Rumsfeld and other Nixon appointees took the reins
190
of federal antipoverty agencies after 1968, activists sought to limit
their power by entrenching local authority. Similarly, disliking President Nixon’s proposal to federalize welfare, these activists aligned
themselves with the far right to preserve the highly decentralized welfare system they had inherited from the New Deal.
Today, conservatives such as Grover Norquist seek to shrink government to a size that would allow it to be dragged into the bathtub
191
and drowned. Other conservatives blame features they dislike in the
current system on federal involvement and see decentralization as an
opportunity to reopen those issues, preferably as a way station on the
192
road to radically reducing the overall public role. The 1996 welfare
law could not have been clearer in retasking Health and Human Services (HHS): it prohibited HHS from imposing any requirements on
193
states without express statutory authorization.
Liberals, in turn, rhapsodize about enlightened people’s ability to
194
make a difference at the grassroots level.
The abiding faith in the

189

To the extent that the Left and the Right did have common ground, it was in a
utilitarian approach to these problems rather than one based on defining social rights
and responsibilities. See LAND, supra note 179, at 31-35 (critiquing the utilitarian, individualistic approach).
190
CLARK, supra note 143, at 128-34.
191
David Theo Goldberg, Deva-Stating Disasters: Race in the Shadow(s) of New Orleans, 3 DU BOIS REV. 83, 86 (2006) (quoting Grover Norquist, President of Americans
for Tax Reform, expressing the desire to “reduce [government] to the size where he
can drag it into the bathroom and drown it in the bathtub.”).
192
See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 171, at 164-66.
193
See 42 U.S.C. § 617 (2000) (“No officer or employee of the Federal Government
may regulate the conduct of States under this part or enforce any provisions of this
part, except to the extent expressly provided in this part.”).
194
See, e.g., HARRY C. BOYTE, THE BACKYARD REVOLUTION: UNDERSTANDING THE
NEW CITIZEN MOVEMENT xi-xiv (1980) (praising community organizers for resisting
corporatist threats to democracy); MANUEL CASTELLS, THE CITY AND THE GRASSROOTS:
A CROSS-CULTURAL THEORY OF URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (1983) (providing case
studies illustrating the role of urban movements in effecting broader social change);
ROBERT FISHER, LET THE PEOPLE DECIDE: NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZING IN AMERICA
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inevitability of successful innovation, and of state and local governments’ fidelity to the interests of low-income people, permeates this
195
viewpoint.
This decentralization of antipoverty policy has persisted despite
considerable inefficiencies. Decentralization imposes the burden of
redistributing to low-income people on narrow segments of society
196
that lack any particular duty or exceptional ability to pay. Indeed, as
proximity is the main basis on which these burdens are imposed, decentralization has the paradoxical effect of increasing low-income
people’s isolation by taxing interactions with them. Thus, a hospital
in an affluent area, or one that closes its emergency room, will not
have to provide uncompensated care; an employer that automates
low-skill functions will not have to pay minimum wage for labor with a
lower market value.
Moreover, because the media and electorate cannot closely monitor each of the numerous local interventions, local action becomes
particularly vulnerable to capture and manipulation by special interests lobbying for subsidies that benefit themselves, rather than subsidies that may be more urgently needed.
b. Participation and Privatization
Both the Left and the Right also embrace privatization through
volunteerism, again for quite different reasons. Conservatives see it as
197
an alternative to, and a rationale for shrinking, government.
As
Democratic politicians increasingly support human-services funding
198
This follows a long hiscuts, they find this vision appealing as well.

(1994) (focusing on the line between the national political economy and local community organizing).
195
See KATZ, CITIZENSHIP, supra note 20, at 354 (noting that although devolution
“seems consistent with American traditions of localism,” local governments’ propensity
to act in the best interests of their citizens is uncertain).
196
Thus, for example, the federal government has required states providing refuge to families that evacuated areas hit by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to pay part of
the additional costs of Medicaid. Families’ choices of destinations appear to result
primarily from proximity; constructing a normative basis for imposing costs on this basis is difficult. The timing of these burdens on state and local governments is similarly
irrational, imposing greater burdens at just the point that these governments’ revenues
are falling. See Super, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 14, at 2629-40.
197
Cf. CLARK, supra note 143, at 160-62 (highlighting President Reagan’s view that
if low-income people truly cannot resolve their issues alone, the private sector would
provide for them).
198
KATZ, CITIZENSHIP, supra note 20, at 163-64.
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tory of citing the supposed capabilities of private charity to eliminate
199
public aid for the poor.
Liberals see volunteerism as “a strengthening of democracy, a
devolution of power not to individuals and private corporations but to
200
local democratic institutions and self-governing communities.” Neither vision treats the benefit to low-income people in need as an important end in itself. Yet even those progressives who embrace neither of these visions—and who recognize that the contributions of
volunteerism pale in comparison to the contributions government can
make—may nonetheless be drawn to volunteerism. Although wishing
for a more robust public response, they may feel that voluntary aid is
better than nothing; for them, abandoning volunteerism because it
conflicts with their philosophical preference for more government action would neglect an ethical duty to aid low-income people as well as
possible.
Some progressives assert that working with low-income people will
enlighten volunteers and make them more sympathetic to govern201
mental involvement.
In practice, volunteerism tends to be highly
parochial: people rarely volunteer outside of communities and organizations of which they are members, and in a nation highly segregated by income, this means that few volunteers develop meaningful
202
interactions with people very different from themselves.
Moreover,
volunteers may fall victim to misinformation as organizations seeking
their contributions systematically tend to understate government’s
contributions and to overstate the impact of volunteers’ work so that
continued contributions seem more important.
An additional factor securing the place of non-profit organizations
in social-welfare provision, and of the voluntary sector in our model of
antipoverty law, is fiscal: the massive infusion of federal funding to
203
those non-profits between the early 1960s and the early 1970s. This
199

Id. at 137-42.
Benjamin R. Barber, The How and Why of Volunteering, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 20,
1997, at E11.
201
Consequently, by the end of the nineteenth century, critics of the poor urged
that government programs replace religious charity because they believed that congregations were too easily deceived by lazy claimants. See KATZ, CITIZENSHIP, supra note
20, at 156 (remarking that, unlike in these earlier periods, religious groups were substantially left out of federal plans during the New Deal).
202
See id. at 147, 165 (acknowledging the failure to spur Americans to volunteer
time and money on causes outside their communities).
203
See id. at 142 (noting primarily the roles of the Public Welfare Amendments of
1962 and Title XX of the Social Security Amendments of 1974).
200
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“mixed economy” of public- and private-sector involvement muddied
204
any competition between the two sectors. If advocates for a stronger
public role begin criticizing nonprofits, they are effectively criticizing
government programs, too.
Yet as both the Left and the Right call for more participation, the
public has grown less inclined to provide it. In the early and mid1990s, while charitable giving increased substantially, giving as a share
205
of income declined.
More significantly, between 1991 and 1997,
charitable contributions to social-service agencies actually declined by
five percent while religious, educational, and medical institutions all
206
experienced double-digit growth.
Giving by private individuals—as
opposed to foundations—has shifted even more sharply away from so207
cial services.
Private giving to human-services charities in 1995 was
less than one percent of the federal government’s spending on social
208
insurance and public assistance that year.
Volunteer work also declined through the 1990s—and what remained was overwhelmingly
209
directed at religious and other non-social-services activities.
Less
than five percent of Americans contribute any time to social welfare
210
Indeed, human-services organizations often
volunteer activities.
lack the capacity to organize and effectively apply voluntary labor of
211
uncertain ability or reliability.
Nonetheless, the participatory, deliberative vision remains firmly
entrenched on both sides of the ideological divide and is often presented as a reason for eschewing governmental action. Antihunger
leader Bill Shore declares that “to transform welfare we must look in
the mirror . . . [n]ot through higher taxes . . . but by giving of our212
selves through whatever skills made us strong.”
The “success of so-

204

See id. (describing private charity as existing “in the shadow of government”).
Id. at 146-47.
206
Id. at 147.
207
See id. (noting that while household donations to social-services programs
dropped five percent from 1991 to 1997, contributions to educational and religious
institutions rose substantially).
208
Id. at 147-48 (comparing $1.5 trillion in federal government social insurance and
public assistance to $12 billion in private donations).
209
See id. (noting that religious organizations received more than twice the time
given to human-services organizations).
210
KEN AULETTA, THE UNDERCLASS 367 (rev. ed. 1999).
211
See KATZ, CITIZENSHIP, supra note 20, at 164 (discussing “the limits of voluntarism”).
212
BILL SHORE, REVOLUTION OF THE HEART: A NEW STRATEGY FOR CREATING
WEALTH AND MEANINGFUL CHANGE 7 (1995).
205
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cial policy depend[s] upon our personal participation.”
His organization and its allies are trying to “reclaim . . . meaningful engagement
214
in [the] communit[y].”
A leading Protestant antihunger group,
Bread for the World, emphasizes broad involvement, declaring that
“hundreds of thousands of leaders at all levels and in all sectors” are
215
necessary, lest “the democratic experiment . . . fail.”
Conservative Charles Murray, who first popularized the idea of
eliminating federal and state antipoverty programs entirely, nonetheless praised local and private-sector philanthropy because of its greater
216
accountability. Making these agencies the focus of aid, he reasoned,
would force low-income people to conduct themselves to win “sympathy from the white middle class” by seeking work and minimizing their
217
requests for aid.
Others argued that “[t]he more administration of
policies and programs is brought down to the state and local level, the
better the people will be able to judge who is fair, who is honest, who
218
is creative, and who is productive and efficient.”
c. Experimentalism
Finally, both Left and Right have enthusiastically embraced experimentalism as a guiding force in antipoverty law. The Reagan administration in 1986 sought to make local experimentalism the basis
219
of a new welfare system.
The Texas Public Policy Foundation declared that “conservative policy experiments at the state and local level
[that] would take place without risk to the rest of the country . . .
could save the country from a continuation of costly, but ineffective
220
liberal policies at the national level.” Rather than articulate detailed

213

Id.
Id. at 11.
215
ELLEN JENNINGS & SHOHREH KERMANI PETERSON, BREAD FOR THE WORLD INST.,
TRANSFORMING ANTI-HUNGER LEADERSHIP: A GUIDE TO THE PROGRAM 1.3 (1996).
216
See CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950–1980,
at 229-30 (1984) (arguing that the increase in resources for local and private human
services following the decrease in federal spending has led to a “more humane, more
wisely distributed, and more effective” service-coverage network).
217
Id. at 231.
218
DAN W. LUFKIN, MANY SOVEREIGN STATES: A CASE FOR STRENGTHENING STATE
GOVERNMENT—AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT 194 (1975).
219
LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY: THE NONWORKING POOR
IN AMERICA 193 (1992).
220
TEX. PUB. POLICY FOUND., MAKING GOVERNMENT WORK: A CONSERVATIVE
AGENDA FOR THE STATES, at xxv (1992) [hereinafter CONSERVATIVE AGENDA].
214
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national proposals, many liberals based their hopes for progress on
221
the results of state experiments.
In practice, both sides’ reliance on research can be selective.
Moreover, even tendentious studies with fundamental, well222
documented flaws have proven influential and been cited by policymakers if they supported those policymakers’ normative stance. On
the other hand, liberals did largely abandon their long-cherished goal
of a guaranteed national income after experiments in Denver and Se223
attle seemed to show that it reduced work effort. Whatever role that
research evidence may have played in resolving particular policy disputes, however, experimentalism did shift the terms of the debate
from broader societal problems that are difficult to measure, such as
224
racism, to criticism of low-income people’s behavior.
Experimentation also played a large role in shaping income support policies. Throughout the 1980s, most states adopted experimental work programs for Aid to Families with Dependent Children
225
(AFDC) recipients that differed widely. Liberals pinned their hopes
on state initiatives that promoted job training under the highly flexi226
ble Family Support Act of 1988 and on major experiments transforming cash assistance and food stamps that Washington State and
227
Minnesota mounted in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Fiscal limitations brought on by the recession of 1990–1991, however, prevented
these proposals from running their full course, to conservatives’ pleas228
ure.
Moreover, with many liberal experiments relying on the rela-

221

See, e.g., LAND, supra note 179, at 109-15 (discussing various state-level
experiments).
222
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY,
AND THE UNDERCLASS 82-83 (1992) (showing the implausibility of Charles Murray’s oftcited assertion that welfare led to out-of-wedlock childbearing).
223
MILDRED REIN, DILEMMAS OF WELFARE POLICY: WHY WORK STRATEGIES HAVEN’T
WORKED 61 (1982).
224
See MEAD, supra note 219, at 197-98 (“The effect was not to end controversy,
however, but to shift its focus from the character of society to that of welfare.”).
225
See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 62-75 (1995) (describing various projects that states enacted in the 1980s).
226
See id. at 76-85 (discussing the law’s flexibility in allowing states to design education and training programs).
227
See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2030–2031 (2006) (authorizing food stamp components of
experiments).
228
Robert Rector & Michael McLaughlin, A Conservative’s Guide to State-Level Welfare
Reform, in CONSERVATIVE AGENDA, supra note 220, at 137, 138.
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tively slow process of building human capital, their short duration
229
meant they had little chance of yielding promising results.
The conservative Heritage Foundation called on “state lawmakers
230
to handle the problem” of welfare.
Conservatives drew attention to
initiatives in Wisconsin, Michigan, and other states to limit eligibility
231
for cash assistance and impose new behavioral requirements.
Because many of these initiatives began as the economy was growing,
and because many saved rather than cost money, they could run their
course. Their advocates made reducing caseloads, as opposed to reducing poverty, their primary focus. Progress by this measure was
much easier to achieve, producing a widespread impression that the
initiatives had been successful.
States also experimented with fundamental solutions to lowincome people’s access to health care. First Minnesota and Vermont,
then Tennessee, and most recently Massachusetts and California have
232
announced bold plans to cover the uninsured.
Each round of experiments has been stalled or curtailed, however, by economic downturns that robbed states of the ability to pay the promised subsidies to
low-income people. Conservatives, in turn, hailed state experiments
233
in mandating managed care for Medicaid recipients.
States and localities face important limits, however, in their ability
to experiment. Although the research is mixed, some studies suggest
that low-income people respond to interstate differences in welfare
policy to a degree roughly comparable to their responses to differential wage opportunities between states: although relatively few move
234
in the short term, over time these factors affect locational decisions.
Moreover, significant redistribution is impossible at the local level in a
society like ours where affluent people have significant mobility.
Wealthy opponents of redistribution can move to jurisdictions lacking
such policies, causing the burden on those remaining to become

229

Id. at 154.
Id. at 138.
231
KATZ, CITIZENSHIP, supra note 20, at 83-103; MEAD, supra note 219, at 190-92; see
also Rector & McLaughlin, supra note 228, at 164 (arguing that welfare benefits should
not be increased when a mother who is receiving benefits has an additional child).
232
See John Holahan & Mary Beth Pohl, Leaders and Laggards in State Coverage Expansions, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY 179, 185-87 ( John Holahan et al. eds.,
2003).
233
Edmund F. Haislmaier, Health Care, in CONSERVATIVE AGENDA, supra note 220,
at 206, 206-08.
234
PETERSON & ROM, supra note 15, at 82-83.
230
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235

more concentrated until they, too, find it intolerable.
Thus, local
programs assisting the poor effectively require virtually unanimous political support, a hurdle that most other public policies need not surmount. Interstate economic competition constrains states’ antipoverty policy choices as policymakers seek to improve their “business
climate” by cutting taxes while preserving services important to the af236
fluent.
Politicians reject policy proposals that seem to put their
237
states too far out of step with others around the country.
Indeed,
absent a consensus about the nature of the problem, democratic experimentalism provides no basis for preferring a community that
helps low-income people lift themselves out of poverty over one that
gives low-income people one-way bus tickets.
Beginning in the late 1980s, the AFDC and Food Stamp Program
sought to reduce improper payments of benefits with very much the
kind of “rolling best-practice rules” that democratic experimentalists
238
advocate.
Both programs had a “quality control” program comparing each state’s error rate to the national average and sanctioning
those with the lowest performance. In both programs, this qualitycontrol review led to resentment from states arguing that their
caseloads were atypically difficult to manage, making the comparison
unfair. These resentments contributed to the elimination of AFDC
239
and nearly killed the Food Stamp Program as well.
Rather than
spurring improved performance, the threat of these penalties drove
the states most at risk to manipulate the metric by removing the most
240
error-prone categories of recipients from their programs.
These
turned out to be low-wage workers, including many needing help with
the transition from cash assistance.
235

See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III, at 677 (2003) (“When local polities
attempt to provide redistribution programs and other programs unwanted by some
taxpayers, individuals vote with their feet and move to communities where such programs do not exist.”).
236
PETERSON & ROM, supra note 15, at 5, 54-55.
237
See id. at 24-38 (describing debates generated by Wisconsin’s benefits program,
which was more generous than that of its neighboring states).
238
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 350-51 (discussing the use of “rolling bestpractice rules” in the context of pollution reduction).
239
David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare” Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271, 1298-1303 (2004)
[hereinafter Super, Quiet Revolution].
240
See David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of Individual Rights, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1109-13 (2005) [hereinafter Super, Efficient
Rights] (discussing the perverse incentives created by the Food Stamp Quality Control
System).
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3. The Centralist Undercurrent in Antipoverty Policy
President Nixon’s election spelled the end of the War on Poverty,
but it did not bring an end to the expansion of antipoverty programs.
His administration broadly opposed deliberative approaches to anti241
poverty law, yet it made numerous aggressive moves against poverty.
The result of the Nixon presidency was to divide antipoverty lawmaking into two very different tracks. One track involved highsalience issues, particularly those characterized as addressing the core
problem of poverty. These remained the subject of extensive deliberations but yielded no action at the federal level. Conservatives attacked broad proposals as creating “entitlements,” taking advantage of
242
the ambiguity of that term.
They railed against President Nixon’s
Family Assistance Plan (FAP), President Ford’s Income Supplementation Plan, and President Carter’s Program for Better Jobs and Income
as the products of “a small, largely liberal, intellectual elite . . . trying
243
to foist on an unsuspecting public . . . a guaranteed income.”
They
regarded the defeat of these programs as evidence of the public’s acute
244
distaste for such guarantees. The Left, in turn, divided over whether
the programs were sufficiently liberal to justify the mantle of “reform.”
This stalemate at the federal level meant that foundational questions could only be addressed through state and local experimentalism. A similar ideological impasse on national health care reform in
1994 resulted in a similar shift in the locus of policymaking on fun245
damental health care issues.
Ideological debates over elevated policy concerns led to neglect of
the mundane business of keeping up with inflation. Expansion in
most means-tested public-benefit programs had slowed or stopped by

241

See, e.g., PIVEN & CLOWARD, MOVEMENTS, supra note 156, at 331-32 (presenting
a series of examples of the Nixon administration’s opposition to programs grassroots
advocates favored).
242
See generally David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 633, 709-10 (2004) [hereinafter Super, Political Economy] (“Supposed subjective
and unconditional entitlements are favorite targets of criticism.”).
243
Martin Anderson, The Objectives of the Reagan Administration’s Social Welfare Policy,
in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT REVISITED 15, 25 (D. Lee Bawden ed., 1984) [hereinafter
REAGAN’S WELFARE POLICY].
244
Id. at 25-26.
245
Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., State and Federal Roles in Health Care: Rationales for
Allocating Responsibilities, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY 31 ( John Holahan et al.
eds., 2003).
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246

1975.
“[T]he degree of protection afforded by the safety net was
declining in real terms even before Ronald Reagan took office in
247
January 1981.” Increases in food stamps and energy assistance failed
to offset declines in real AFDC benefits during the 1970s, even for
248
families receiving all three benefits.
At the same time, however, a second track developed at the federal level to address several low-salience “secondary” programs. These
249
initiatives required, and obtained, bipartisan coalitions. Contrary to
popular belief, antipoverty policies enjoyed strong Republican support throughout the twentieth century, with only brief interrup250
tions.
Thus, while President Nixon’s FAP was slowly dying in Congress,
he prevailed on three monumental structural improvements in antipoverty programs: combining and federalizing cash assistance to the
elderly and people with disabilities as the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, expanding the Food Stamp Program to cover
the entire country, and establishing the Section 8 voucher program
for low-income people in private housing. All three significantly reduced state and local discretion: SSI replaced three federal/state programs similar to AFDC in which states enjoyed broad freedom to determine eligibility and benefit levels; the food stamp legislation forced
many recalcitrant counties into the program; and local housing authorities had far less control over vouchers than they did over the
housing projects they replaced. Again in 1977, divisions on both the
Left and the Right killed President Carter’s welfare-reform initiative,
but the bipartisan Food Stamp Act of 1977 offered benefits to millions
of low-wage workers.
After a hiatus during the Carter administration’s decline and the
first years of the Reagan Revolution, bipartisan efforts to find substantive compromises on low-salience antipoverty issues eventually resumed. Congress expanded Medicaid every year from 1984 to 1990;
liberalized the Food Stamp Program in 1983, 1987, 1988, and 1993;
provided more child-care funds in 1988, 1990, and 1993; and grew the

246

Timothy M. Smeeding, Is the Safety Net Still Intact?, in REAGAN’S WELFARE
POLICY, supra note 243, at 69, 90.
247
Id. at 91.
248
Id. at 90.
249
PETERSON & ROM, supra note 15, at 99.
250
Id. at 117.
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Earned Income Tax Credit in 1986, 1990, and 1993.
These dramatic improvements were little-noticed products of elite politics.
Whenever the broader political community focused on an issue, it
deadlocked.
The one successful effort to legislate federally on high-salience antipoverty programs that was genuinely bipartisan was the Family Sup252
port Act of 1988.
Although commonly described as “welfare reform,” its welfare and work provisions did little beyond authorizing
and funding state experiments whose normative content it largely
failed to specify. Its signal achievements came in lower-salience programs, particularly Medicaid and child-care subsidies. It therefore was
a simultaneous exercise in decentralized experimentalism over highprofile issues and centralized, negotiated policymaking on more
obscure topics.
4. Departures from the Model: Moments of Heightened Passion
For the most part, during the last four decades, attention to antipoverty policy issues of major symbolic importance has largely been
characterized by copious debate within and between the liberal and
conservative communities at all levels of government, and relatively
modest local innovations that other jurisdictions rarely copied, whatever their results. Pragmatic policymakers of both parties worked together quietly on antipoverty issues deemed secondary to each side’s
ideological agenda.
On three occasions, however, public sentiment became unusually
inflamed in favor of one side or the other. In 1981, President Reagan
persuaded the public that economic revival depended on large cuts in
taxes and domestic spending. Newt Gingrich led Republicans to victory in the election of 1994 on a “Contract with America,” asserting in
part that antipoverty programs were out of control and fostering idleness. And, in 2005, seeing low-income people’s extreme vulnerability
to Hurricane Katrina stimulated a massive wave of public sympathy.
From 1981 to 1982 and from 1995 to 1996, congressional critics
succeeded in enacting deep cuts in antipoverty programs that contrasted sharply with either the decentralized, experimentalist approach
251

Alone among these initiatives, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
was not bipartisan. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (codified in scattered sections of
7, 26, and 42 U.S.C.). The acrimony then focused on taxes, not the benefit expansion.
252
Pub. L. No. 100-485 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
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to high-salience issues or the moderate elite negotiations that typically
govern low-salience issues. On both occasions, not only did professed
commitments to decentralization and participation fail to slow these
centralized, ideological moves, but democratic experimentalist tropes
were invoked to justify the moves. Yet in Katrina’s wake, antipoverty
advocates were so mired in decentralized, deliberative, experimentalist policymaking that they were unable to coalesce around a significant
policy proposal before the opportunity dissipated.
a. The Reagan Budget Cuts
President Reagan pushed legislation through Congress that cut
federal fiscal year 1983’s domestic spending $43 billion below the level
253
required to maintain current services.
These reductions focused
overwhelmingly on programs serving low-income people. Indeed, between 1980 and 1983, the share of federal spending devoted to nonmeans-tested social programs rose slightly while that for means-tested
254
programs dropped seventeen percent.
Over two-thirds of the
budget cuts affected families with incomes below $20,000, while only
255
ten percent affected those with incomes above $40,000. This legislation terminated numerous antipoverty programs entirely, replacing
them with loosely drawn block grants that did little more than transfer
resources to state and local governments. President Reagan obtained
256
additional cuts in safety-net programs over the next few years.
Decentralization and community involvement in addressing poverty were central themes in the Reagan administration’s justification
of its cuts: “Leave to private initiative all the functions that citizens
can perform privately. . . . Use the level of government closest to the
257
community for all public functions it can handle.” The benefit cuts
helped fund large tax cuts—the administration argued that cutting
federal taxes allowed states and localities more fiscal room to raise
258
taxes to support programs devolved to them.

253

Stuart E. Eizenstat, Comments, in REAGAN’S WELFARE POLICY, supra note 243, at

28, 29.
254

Jack A. Meyer, Budget Cuts in the Reagan Administration: A Question of Fairness, in
REAGAN’S WELFARE POLICY, supra note 243, at 33, 37-38.
255
See Eizenstat, supra note 253, at 29-30 (citing CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, MAJOR
LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN HUMAN RESOURCES PROGRAMS SINCE JANUARY 1981, at 76
tbl.1 (1983)).
256
Smeeding, supra note 246, at 103-06.
257
Anderson, supra note 243, at 24-25.
258
Id.
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In practice, this decentralization did more to conceal the depth of
the cuts than to empower local democracy. The block grants generally amounted to only about seventy-five percent of the prior funding
259
for the programs that they were replacing.
Even these were specified to last only for a transition period, until 1988, after which states
were expected to raise their own revenues to pay for whatever services
260
they chose to continue.
Indeed, the Reagan administration sought
to reduce federal funding from one-quarter of state and local budgets
in 1980 to four or five percent in 1991, roughly the same percentage
261
as existed in 1933.
Seeing this pattern, states rallied to block the
262
devolution of AFDC and food stamps.
Although the Reagan administration happily cited research that
263
supported its views, it ignored experimental results that did not suit
it. A former senior administration official noted “a fundamental flaw
in the administration’s welfare logic—namely, that . . . [s]tudies have
consistently found that long-term welfare dependency is the exception
rather than the rule, and that our welfare system most often serves as a
temporary fallback position for those individuals living at the margin
264
who suffer unexpected setbacks.”
b. The 1996 Welfare Law
A decade later, the first President Bush initiated a process leading
to even more severe cuts in a thoroughly experimentalist way: by
granting waivers of federal rules to several governors wanting to reshape welfare within their states. Many of these waivers “appear
merely to be attempts to reduce benefits under the guise of experi265
mentation.”
President Clinton accelerated this process, eventually
266
granting waivers to forty-three states.
Neither administration was
prepared to expend much political capital pressing unwilling states to
259

Eizenstat, supra note 253, at 28-29
Id.
261
Id. at 30.
262
Smeeding, supra note 246, at 107 (describing the “dismay[]” of state officials at
the prospect of the federal government delegating AFDC and Food Stamp Program to
the states).
263
See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 254, at 54 (discussing empirical research on the work
incentives of AFDC beneficiaries).
264
G. William Hoagland, Comments, in REAGAN’S WELFARE POLICY, supra note 243,
at 121, 122-23.
265
Susan Bennett & Kathleen A. Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and Welfare
“Reform,” 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 741, 745 (1993).
266
KATZ, CITIZENSHIP, supra note 20, at 91.
260
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conduct rigorous evaluations of their experiments. As leading conservative commentators noted, states and localities enamored by their reform ideas resisted rigorous experiments because they did not want to
267
exempt a control group.
When Newt Gingrich led Republicans to congressional majorities
in 1994, they repeated the Reagan cuts on a much grander scale.
Gone was Reagan-era rhetoric about protecting those in the greatest
268
need. The 1996 welfare law repealed AFDC, transferring its funding
into the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) block grant.
It also cut almost $55 billion over six years from other means-tested
programs, particularly food stamps, benefits for legal immigrants, and
269
SSI for children with disabilities. Virtually none of these budget cuts
had even an ostensible connection to promoting work or marriage or
to reducing fraud; budget cuts of this nature, as a group, dramatically
270
increase burdens on state and local governments. Indeed, even the
most prominent lobbyist for the legislation, the Heritage Foundation’s
Robert Rector, had earlier argued that experimental evidence demonstrated that compelling mothers of preschool children to work fulltime outside the home, the legislation’s centerpiece, was harmful:
It is particularly important to avoid imposing work requirements on
AFDC mothers with children under age five. [T]here is now a substantial body of evidence indicating that separating a young child from its
mother for long periods of time has strong, negative effects on the child’s
271
development. This is particularly true for children under age two.

Nonetheless, conservatives presented the law in thoroughly experimentalist terms. According to four of its key House Republican sponsors,
[an] important outcome of block grant policy is innovation. If states are
given maximum authority and flexibility, they will develop widely divergent policies. Flexibility yields innovation. Through innovation, a host
of new and potentially effective welfare strategies can be developed and
tested. This innovation can be seen in the welfare waiver programs states
mounted in the years leading up to the 1996 reform. . . .

267

Rector & McLaughlin, supra note 228, at 154.
President Reagan pledged during the campaign and in his first budget to protect the “safety net.” He sought to portray himself as seeking to improve the efficiency
of programs rather than eliminating them. Anderson, supra note 243, at 17-18.
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DAVID A. SUPER ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, THE NEW WELFARE LAW (1996), available at http://www.cbpp.org/WECNF813.HTM.
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E.g., HANDLER, supra note 225, at 135-37.
271
Rector & McLaughlin, supra note 228, at 161.
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. . . [S]tates will also submit their programs to third-party evaluations to
examine the impacts of their new policies. Again, this tendency can be
seen clearly in the state waiver programs that preceded national reform
272
in 1996.

The scope of states’ data-reporting requirements was one of the
273
hardest-fought issues in the 1996 welfare law.
The Washington Post
reported that “[e]ighteen months after federal lawmakers dramatically changed the nation’s welfare program, it is becoming clear that
the mass of data the government requires states to collect is in such
disarray that it is impossible to determine whether the law is work274
ing.”
In the end, however, one highly contestable metric came to
275
dominate: caseload reduction.
This outcome, of course, provided
no insight into how the programs were meeting any of their humane
goals, especially with states no longer obliged to provide aid to families in need. To the extent that analysts considered a secondary mea276
sure, it was workforce connection.
Positive impacts on poverty or
child well-being were either assumed or ignored.
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NANCY L. JOHNSON ET AL., WELFARE REFORM HAS ALREADY ACHIEVED MAJOR
SUCCESSES: A HOUSE REPUBLICAN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF WELFARE REFORM
10 (1999).
273
Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 104-430, at 351-56 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). Like many issues in
that legislation, these were debated and resolved in the conference committee on the
initial welfare bill that President Clinton vetoed in early 1996, and they were not reopened when Congress prepared the very similar legislation that President Clinton
signed that summer. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-725, at 302-04 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2690-92 (describing identical reporting requirements in the House and Senate versions of the 1996 bill).
274
Barbara Vobejda & Judith Havemann, States’ Welfare Data Disarray Clouds
Analysis, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1998, at A1.
275
See, e.g., JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 272, at 15-18 (“Consideration of the effects
of welfare reform must begin with caseload reductions.”); IRENE LURIE, AT THE FRONT
LINES OF THE WELFARE SYSTEM 253-59 (2006).
276
See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 272, at 16-21 figs. 2-6 (discussing the increases in
the work rates after the 1996 welfare law); LURIE, supra note 275, at 263 (pronouncing
fears of harm to low-income families unfounded because sixty percent of adults in
families leaving cash assistance “were employed at some point during the first 13 weeks
off welfare” and over seventy percent had a job at some point within the year).

2008]

Laboratories of Destitution

591

c. Hurricane Katrina
277

Because disasters rivet the public’s attention, they provide an
immediate opportunity for change in policy areas otherwise stale278
mated in obscurity. Critics of the status quo try to seize these opportunities by generalizing from the disaster and urging the nation to
279
“heed the lessons” that failings surrounding the disaster taught.
These changes, however, are only transitory. In the recovery period,
secondary values—such as wealth, status, and comfort—regain pri280
macy. The news media rapidly loses interest in disasters as dramatic
281
events give way to “prosaic” rebuilding efforts.
The established
order’s apologists therefore emphasize the exceptional nature of
the disaster and try to hasten its disappearance from the collective
consciousness.
Antipoverty advocates never came close to formulating a winning
282
response to the Katrina disaster.
With policymaking so decentral277

This is not to say that that such disasters universally ennoble the public; some
of this attention is expressed in morbid, voyeuristic ways. See Robert N. Strassfeld, Taking Another Ride on Flopper: Benjamin Cardozo, Safe Space, and the Cultural Significance of
Coney Island, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2189, 2213 (2004) (describing amusement park attractions recreating the Galveston and Johnstown floods and crowded, burning tenements).
278
Special interest groups and politicians long have exploited disasters to highlight issues of importance to them or to gain favorable publicity. See CHARLES E. FRITZ
& J. H. MATHEWSON, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, CONVERGENCE BEHAVIOR IN DISASTERS
58 (1957) (listing ways that special interest groups and others exploit disasters opportunistically); see also KINGDON, supra note 9, at 187 (arguing that attracting public attention is a prerequisite to achieving political change).
279
The lessons can be about private as well as public law. See, e.g., Jed Handelsman
Shugerman, Note, The Floodgates of Strict Liability: Bursting Reservoirs and the Adoption of
Fletcher v. Rylands in the Gilded Age, 110 YALE L.J. 333, 335 (2000) (tracing the adoption of strict-liability tort standards to a series of disasters, including the Johnstown
flood of 1889). Moreover, those seeking to teach these lessons may have policy agendas quite distinct from relief of human disaster victims. See Phillip M. Bender, Restoring
the Elwha, White Salmon, and Rogue Rivers: A Comparison of Dam Removal Proposals in the
Pacific Northwest, 17 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 189, 198, 203 n.63 (1997) (invoking the disasters resulting from the failures of the Johnstown and St. Francis dams in
support of an environmentalist proposal to restore rivers’ natural flow).
280
James D. Thompson & Robert W. Hawkes, Disaster, Community Organization, and
Administrative Process, in MAN AND SOCIETY IN DISASTER 268, 281-82 (George W. Baker
& Dwight W. Chapman eds., 1962).
281
HARRY ESTILL MOORE ET AL., NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, BEFORE THE WIND: A
STUDY OF THE RESPONSE TO HURRICANE CARLA 126 (1963); cf. James Dao, Louisiana
Sees Faded Urgency in Relief Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2005, at A1 (reporting the decrease in the nation’s attention to the travails of Hurricane Katrina survivors only three
months after the hurricane).
282
E.J. Dionne, Jr., Op-Ed., That Was a Short War on Poverty, WASH. POST, Oct. 14,
2005, at A19.
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ized, antipoverty advocates had no strong national organization and
hence no unified federal policy agenda. They frittered away valuable
time debating what to propose; over a year later, Congressional Quarterly
Weekly reported that “the debate over poverty is alive and vigorous,
283
though mostly outside official Washington.”
Despite the enormity
of the problem, as well as the failure of four decades of decentralized,
participatory, experimentalist responses to poverty before Katrina,
that approach remained dominant: “Cities and states . . . have in particular become ‘leading thinkers and doers’” and cities are “organizing partnerships with private companies, foundations and even low284
income communities themselves to address some of these issues.”
Conspicuously “lacking . . . [was] the political leadership that
285
could put all the pieces together into a broader, coherent plan.”
The result was a laundry list of requests with little coherent unifying
theme on which the public could be enlisted. Proposals included
changes to the Food Stamp Program even though it had been by far
the most effective program in responding to the disaster. Others put
more money into the TANF block grant, despite its structural inability
to keep money from leaking out to unrelated state priorities. Proposals for additional housing vouchers made more sense substantively;
grossly inadequate housing had greatly increased low-income people’s
vulnerability to the storm, and the lack of housing resources kept
many doubled-up or in cramped trailers for months and years afterwards. Yet the major national housing-aid programs all arbitrarily cap
participation; although a higher cap helps more people than a lower
one, the difference is not intuitive to middle-income people. As a result, any increase in the number of vouchers would be highly vulnerable to subsequent budget cuts.
The most promising proposal was health care legislation cosponsored by the Republican Chairman and the Democratic Ranking
Member of the Senate Finance Committee, Charles Grassley and Max
Baucus respectively. The bill would have extended federally financed
health insurance to all low- and moderate-income people in the affected areas without regard to Medicaid’s usual rules relating to age,
286
health, or family status.
The Finance Committee endorsed this
measure, but Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist and Senate Budget

283
284
285
286

John Cochran, New Perspectives on Poverty, 64 CQ WKLY. 2802 (2006).
Id. at 2802-03.
Id. at 2804.
S. 1716, 109th Cong. 102 (2005).
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Chairman Judd Gregg prevented it from coming to the floor. They
feared its expressive value as a precedent for national health insur287
ance.
Although health care advocacy groups supported the
Grassley-Baucus bill, no broad movement came to its aid.
B. Political Sources of Antipoverty Law
The pattern of antipoverty law development is complex. It operates on two sharply contrasting tracks: a centralized, negotiated, substance-oriented, non-ideological track that has produced significant
advances on low-salience issues, and a democratic experimentalist
track for high-salience issues that has been effectively stalemated
along ideological lines. Unusual circumstances that temporarily
strengthen foes of antipoverty programs can lead to high-salience cuts,
often justified in democratic experimentalist terms. As the prior section demonstrated, however, surges in public sympathy for lowincome people do not lead to corresponding program expansion.
This process’s peculiar characteristics spring from the peculiar
constellation of interests and motivations of the participants. Subsection 1 examines the major groups commonly supporting antipoverty
programs. Subsection 2 considers those often regarded as foes of
these programs. And subsection 3 explains how these groups’ interests converge to produce this two-track process and the one-sided departures from it.
1. Major Forces Supporting Antipoverty Programs
To endure, any policy regime allocating significant resources must
provide value to a group of people with sufficient political capital to
sustain it. That value need not be purely avaricious; some people derive great pleasure from seeing their vision of a proper society implemented even if it does not benefit them tangibly.
The obvious constituency for antipoverty programs is the lowincome beneficiary population. In practice, however, low-income
people have lacked sufficient political strength to sustain these programs. Despite occasional organizing campaigns, low-income people

287

Cf. 151 CONG. REC. S10578-79 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2005) (letter from Dep’t of
Health and Human Servs. to Sen. William H. Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate) (expressing the Bush administration’s opposition to the “massive new Federal program”
being considered).
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288

vote at relatively low rates.
They also have relatively weak group
identification: their votes may easily be driven by issues other than antipoverty policy, either because they do not expect to remain poor or
because they blame themselves for their situation. By definition, they
cannot afford meaningful political contributions. Because this country has recognized few positive rights for low-income people, the
group lacks the leverage that the ability to release claims can provide.
Moreover, many welfare-rights organizations have taken positions so
extreme that they have effectively excluded themselves from policy debates. Whether out of discomfort or paternalism, their allies have
hesitated to speak candidly with them about political realities.
As a result, antipoverty programs depend heavily on support from
people too affluent to qualify for them. These supporters’ motives fall
into several categories, each with quite different consequences.
a. Humanitarians
Some people simply empathize with human suffering. Others
base their humanitarianism on developed moral theories. For example, religious and other moral codes charge individuals, and society at
289
large, with responsibility for preventing suffering.
Preventing extreme suffering is a minimum requirement of many conceptions of
distributive justice and may be essential for democratic processes to
function well. Although few associate humanitarian attitudes with
utilitarianism, some normative public-choice theory postulates that
ethical voters will equally value their own utility and that of others,
causing them to support redistribution that benefits the typical recipi290
ent more than it decreases their own well-being.
The political process can respond to ethically based preferences
just as it can respond to self-interested ones, but these two kinds of
291
aims differ in important practical ways. Milk producers’, steel workers’, or gun enthusiasts’ demands on the political system reflect their
direct knowledge and constantly occupy their minds. Middle-class
supporters of antipoverty programs, by contrast, may have little direct

288

FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON’T VOTE 4
(1st paperback ed. 1989).
289
See, e.g., LAND, supra note 179, at 31-35 (comparing modern Catholic social
thought’s concern “for the growth and improvement of the social order as a whole”
with liberalism’s and conservatism’s views of the common good).
290
MUELLER, supra note 235, at 570.
291
Id. at 49-52.
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knowledge of either the nature or the extent of low-income people’s
travails. Rent-seeking interest groups presumably understand the
benefits they receive, whether from one source or twenty; politicians
are unlikely to fool them by creating insignificant or inaccessible programs. By contrast, low-income people’s middle-income sympathizers
are likely to be bewildered by a proliferation of programs and overes292
timate what society is already doing.
Humanitarian support for antipoverty programs thus tends to be
quite episodic. Humanitarians may be distracted easily by other public interest commitments or by more self-serving pursuits. And assistance to low-income people can be seen as a public good. As a result,
because everyone can be said to benefit when poverty is relieved
whether or not they contributed to the effort, free riders will keep
293
nongovernmental relief efforts small.
In addition, altruistic advocates of antipoverty programs often
hold visions of the public interest that make them unreliable champions. In particular, they may have a cross-cutting vision of “good government” that makes them reluctant to log-roll to advance antipoverty
294
programs’ interests.
Their sense of “good government” also can
make altruists more responsive than most to calls for shared sacrifice
for fiscal rectitude. For example, antipoverty programs bore a grossly
disproportionate share of cuts in both Democratic and Republican
balanced budget plans of 1995–1996, with little public controversy.
The divided loyalties of altruistic supporters of antipoverty programs
increase these programs’ vulnerability to large cuts in times of deficit
while providing no corresponding advantage in times of surplus.
b. Social Insurers
Some people whose current means suffice to preclude their qualification for antipoverty programs fear they may need aid in the future.
These concerns have had uneven effects. On the one hand, social in-

292

Super, Political Economy, supra note 242, at 696-705 (describing nonrecipients’
difficulties comprehending the true nature of public-benefit programs).
293
See MUELLER, supra note 235, at 47-49 (arguing for a government redistribution
program rather than a purely voluntary, charitable approach because of the free-rider
problem).
294
One of the most successful antipoverty programs, the Food Stamp Program,
has advanced in part because its supporters held no such compunctions, tying their
fate to that of subsidies for corporate farms that are difficult to defend on the merits.
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surance, along with closely associated means-tested programs, has
established an income floor for most of the elderly, a large fraction of
persons with disabilities, and a significantly smaller share of the recently unemployed. Conservative challenges to Social Security and
Medicare failed because middle-income people can imagine themselves needing assistance in age and infirmity. On the other hand, assaults on unemployment insurance have fared better as fewer middleincome voters envision themselves becoming unemployed for signifi296
cant periods.
The social insurance approach, however, has provided little traction for dealing with chronic poverty because middle-class people
cannot imagine themselves facing that need. Universalizing antipoverty programs would radically increase their costs while doing little to
broaden their appeal. Efforts to persuade middle-income voters that
government should provide them with “food security” in the same way
it provides Social Security—hence that school meals should be free to
all children—collapsed of their own weight when predictably few
middle-class voters proved insecure about their access to food.
c. Redistributionists
Some progressives are not satisfied with relieving severe depriva297
tion and seek to reduce wealth inequalities more generally.
Although antipoverty programs advance this agenda, this country’s resistance to European-style social support has hampered efforts to
significantly expand eligibility for those programs. Accordingly, redistributionists have focused more on tax policy and regulatory transfers,
such as labor law and tariffs. Opponents sometimes seek to discredit
antipoverty programs by associating them with redistributionists.

295

Although SSI is not social insurance under most definitions, in operating it the
Social Security Administration (SSA) relies significantly on eligibility decisions made
for Social Security Disability Insurance. Similarly, Medicaid is means-tested but operates as a Medicare supplement for the elderly and those persons with disabilities that
receive Medicare. Congress designed the means test for Medicaid’s nursing-home
component to allow large numbers of middle-income people to receive care once
Medicare’s modest nursing-care benefit runs out.
296
CHARLES NOBLE, WELFARE AS WE KNEW IT: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 136-37 (1997).
297
See REBECCA M. BLANK, IT TAKES A NATION: A NEW AGENDA FOR FIGHTING POVERTY 140-42 (1997) (comparing the United States’s wealth-transfer systems unfavorably
with those of other Western nations); MARTIN CARNOY & DEREK SHEARER, ECONOMIC
DEMOCRACY: THE CHALLENGE OF THE 1980S, at 334-43 (1980) (advocating the use of
social-welfare policy to reduce inequality).
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d. Providers
Some people have direct interests in antipoverty programs despite
being ineligible for their benefits. Builders want contracts for housing
projects, hospitals and nursing homes want reimbursement for their
services, and so on. Even some of those engaged in volunteerism want
their work subsidized, for example with government food to distribute
at church pantries. Some groups receive funding to advocate for antipoverty policy.
Just as often, however, providers start competing with the programs’ beneficiaries for resources—as farm interests do with nutrition
298
programs and homebuilders do with housing vouchers—or warp the
programs’ priorities to meet their own interests. In addition, some
providers derive little enough income from antipoverty programs that
they may ignore all but the most important decisions.
e. Instrumentalists
Some see antipoverty programs as avoiding negative externalities
such as crime, infectious diseases, visible homelessness, and hungry
children disrupting classrooms. Before 1989, some saw ameliorating
299
poverty as crucial to propaganda struggles with communism.
Instrumentalists, however, can be unreliable. Other means, albeit
sometimes repressive ones, can provide easier remedies for some
problems. And the kinds of benefits they seek are generally public
goods, with the attendant risks of free-riding. Moreover, antipoverty
programs’ opponents find instrumentalists relatively easy to dissuade
with empirical evidence casting programs’ effectiveness into doubt.
f. Liberal Expressivists
300

Many liberals use antipoverty policy for expressive purposes. In
a sense, expressivists are another type of instrumentalist. Some seek
governmental endorsement of a substantive message: an economic
message involving redistribution or a social message. Others’ values
are process-oriented, such as those that won broad participation requirements in War on Poverty programs. With the National Welfare
Rights Organization’s collapse in the early 1970s and persistent diffi-

298
299
300

Super, Quiet Revolution, supra note 239, at 1383 n.480.
Super, New Moralizers, supra note 9, at 2075 n.138.
Super, Quiet Revolution, supra note 239, at 1273-83.
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culties organizing successors, low-income people’s direct participation
in policy deliberations is easiest to arrange on the local level. This
aligns many liberal procedural expressivists with the democratic
experimentalists.
Improving the well-being of low-income people, and of the society
to which they belong, may provide insufficient motivation to engage
expressivists in debates over antipoverty policy. When liberal substantive expressivists participate, they drive the liberal policy agenda to the
left. They may be unwilling to accept anything less than their ideal set
of policies: they may feel that the expressive costs of a compromise
exceed the benefits that it could bring even in situations where most
groups advocating out of self-interest would find a deal advantageous.
They may feel that programs modest enough to have any political
chance of success—modest enough to represent the irreducible cost
of indisputable necessities and to placate concerns about moral hazard—would send little expressive message. Expressivists often seek to
shame more moderate antipoverty advocates, blocking potential
agreements with conservatives. And because messages can be sent
through many different kinds of policy, they tend to drift in and out
of antipoverty debates.
Even more moderate expressivists may be more committed to
movement in a positive direction—to having society “do something”—
than to any particular set of substantive results. They may regard poverty as an intractable problem but nonetheless balk at the expressive
implications of ignoring it. As a result, they may not be as demanding
about the efficiency of the expenditure of the funds they secure. Indeed, some may satisfy their desire to “do something” with private
charitable efforts, making them less dogged advocates for public antipoverty funding.
2. Antipoverty Programs’ Critics
Most opposition to antipoverty programs falls into three categories: instrumental, fiscal, and expressive. Economic conservatives object on instrumental grounds to many aspects of antipoverty programs: perceived insufficient incentives to work and marry, arbitrary
differences in the treatment of comparably impoverished people, the
multiplicity of programs, and the failure to target funds to the poor-
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301

est.
Although some support devolution, others criticize the incen302
tives to migrate that differential welfare policies can create.
The cost of antipoverty programs also produces opposition.
Those with other fiscal priorities—other spending programs, tax cuts,
or deficit reduction—may oppose antipoverty spending programs.
Those subject to regulatory redistributions, such as low-wage employers or landlords, may oppose minimum wages or rent controls. The
activity of these opponents is likely to depend on the amount of resources that antipoverty programs are redistributing and the relative
vulnerability of other potential sources for similar amounts of resources.
Finally, conservatives, like liberals, often seek to make expressive
points through antipoverty law. Here, too, the expression can be substantive or procedural. Substantive expressivists may see cutting or
eliminating an antipoverty program as making a statement about the
proper size of government or the importance of an unregulated market without arousing the kind of opposition that an assault on farm
price supports would bring. Moral statements have become increasingly common: “new moralizers” can impose restrictions on low-income families through eligibility conditions that could never be im303
posed on the middle class.
The conservative procedural expressivist agenda involves shifting
304
functions to lower levels of government or to the private sector.
Here again, symbolic achievements devolving antipoverty programs
are easier than devolving or selling off national parks prized by more
affluent voters. Devolution and privatization can work at cross305
purposes with substantive objectives—expressive or otherwise —but
301

MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATE107-08 (1980).
302
See, e.g., id.
303
See Super, New Moralizers, supra note 9, at 2051-53 (“[T]he new moralizers have
called for objective determinations of morality based on arbitrary per se standards.
These standards typically have little to do with the actual state of mind of the individuals being judged, but the inferences they draw are likely to seem plausible to middleclass policymakers, reporters, and voters that have little contact with the judged individuals.” (citation omitted)).
304
See David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CAL. L. REV.
393, 395-98 (2008) [hereinafter Super, Privatization] (finding the movement to privatize public-benefit administration to be motivated more by ideology than probable
results).
305
Jon Michaels, Deforming Welfare: How the Dominant Narratives of Devolution and
Privatization Subverted Federal Welfare Reform, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 598-99 (2004)
(“[S]tate, church, and private welfare vendors may exploit their discretionary authority
MENT
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conservative procedural expressivists typically have not objected to
substantive conditions on devolution.
Like their liberal counterparts, conservative expressivists often
have little interest in half-measures and often shame more moderate
colleagues. They also may drift away to act on opportunities in other
policy areas. On the other hand, they enjoy two key advantages over
liberal expressivists: their wholly substantive orientation allows them
to seize opportunities decisively without the time-consuming deliberations that liberals prize, and their desired policies generally are inexpensive, freeing them from competition for scarce public resources.
3. Origins of Democratic Experimentalism in Antipoverty Law
The diversity, and often frailty, of interests among supporters of
antipoverty programs undermines their effectiveness relative to other
competitors for public funds. It also contributes to the peculiar twotrack mechanism by which antipoverty policy is made. In particular,
expressivists on both ends of the political spectrum drive the process
toward democratic experimentalism. Conservative procedural expressivists favor decentralization on its merits; liberal procedural expressivists find local and state governments, and private nonprofits,
the venues best suited to the participatory, deliberative mode of decision making they favor; and substantive expressivists on both wings
have far better chances of finding ideologically skewed localities receptive to their proposals than they do of prevailing nationally. Similarly, social insurers and redistributionists have little reason to participate in national policy debates that can only bear fruit through
compromise with conservatives staunchly opposed to their views.
Some liberal advocacy groups also may find it easier to raise funds for
a continual series of local battles than for preparatory work during
lulls in national attention to poverty. On the other wing, fiscal opponents of antipoverty programs may feel at less risk because state and
local revenue-raising capacity is far weaker than the federal government’s. In sum, contrary to the democratic experimentalists’ implicit
assumption that decentralized problem-solving will flourish on the basis of shared values, it is precisely the lack of such values that drives
the decentralization of antipoverty policy.

and under-provide services in ways that leave hundreds of thousands of individuals materially far worse off than even a fiscally conservative Congress might have intended.”).
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Results-oriented humanitarians, provider groups, and instrumentalists, on the other hand, may prefer centralized policymaking because it offers the greatest return on advocacy efforts invested and because policymakers on that level have access to superior data and
analytical resources. To reach compromises with economic conservatives, however, they must ensure the nonparticipation of expressivists on both wings, who often try to shame their more moderate
colleagues out of such compromises. In-kind programs, and cash
programs for relatively sympathetic populations, have less expressive
potential, making them superior candidates for pragmatic consensus. In
addition, most non-cash benefits are of little interest to middle-income
people which assures little involvement from social insurers or redistributionists, either of whom might scare off pragmatic conservatives.
During sharp swings to the right, like those after the 1980 and
1994 elections, right-wing expressivists see sufficient opportunities to
justify reentering national policymaking. Expressivists on the left, by
contrast, have great difficulty seizing transitory political opportunities.
Their number includes many proceduralists who are opposed to an
elite’s rapid formulation of a program. Even within substantive expressivists, divisions about what message to enact, and the desire to
take on the symbolic challenge of cash assistance, hampers timely
formulation of proposals to respond to moments of heightened public
sympathy.
This suggests a discontinuity in the politics of antipoverty programs, with the positions of those programs’ opponents responding to
the scale of proposed changes far more than their supporters. Small
cuts may be politically infeasible because programs’ supporters will react angrily to the symbolism while the proceeds are insufficient to
purchase significant support from fiscal conservatives or other interest
groups. Because they are not personally affected, however, those supporters may not react much more intensely to proposed cuts large
enough to fund meaningful advances in some other group’s agenda.
When antipoverty programs are reduced incrementally, it is generally
through design features that allow those cuts to occur passively (e.g., a
failure to adjust for inflation or the failure to increase an appropria306
tion to respond to increased need during recessions).

306
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III. CONSTRUCTING A SUBSTANTIVE CONSENSUS IN ANTIPOVERTY LAW
Scholars and policymakers increasingly recognize that the decentralized, experimentalist model’s key assumptions are not met. President Reagan’s success waging war on mythical “welfare queens” shattered the faith many had in widely shared benevolent norms toward
the poor and in policymakers’ openness to serious debate based on
verifiable data. The 1996 welfare law’s dismantlement of AFDC, along
with its gratuitous cuts in food stamps and aid to impoverished legal
immigrants, further demonstrated the depth of the dissensus on basic
values. Moreover, conservatives’ successes in setting major substantive
policies have not warmed many of them to deliberative decision making in the implementation of those policies. Some continue to equate
fair hearings with obstruction of behavioral requirements and obfus307
cation of the moral messages those requirements seek to convey.
The catastrophe of Hurricane Katrina, however, eliminated all
meaningful doubt. The destitution of 100,000 New Orleans residents,
and tens of thousands of others across the Gulf Coast, showed the abject failure of the system of antipoverty law constructed over the last
forty years. Whether due to state and local governments’ lack of capacity, their lack of desire, or deliberative delay, devolving primary responsibility for fighting poverty to them left vast numbers of people
too poor to flee a clearly predicted devastating storm. And in
Katrina’s aftermath, “the incomplete and ambiguous . . . specification
308
of means and ends” that the democratic experimentalists celebrate
left sincere opponents of poverty at all points on the political spectrum without a ready response and paralyzed the political process until the opportunity had passed. Even Cass Sunstein a committed advocate of deliberative policy formulation, recognizes the need for “an
309
agreed-upon background.” This background was fatally lacking.
Whenever a structure or a machine suffers a catastrophic failure,
one of the first questions that engineers must answer is which components were to blame and which can continue to function effectively in
the future. The same is true of a legal system that fails catastrophically
to serve the purpose for which it was created. Thus, although many
facets of tort law were discarded when they proved impediments to
industrialization, others remained. Similarly, although the Court
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abandoned several constitutional doctrines after 1937, it continued or
retasked others. In the same vein, the basic challenge for scholars in
the wake of these twin catastrophic failures of our antipoverty lawmaking system is to identify which aspects of that system to abandon and
which elements can perform important functions in a new, viable
model.
A successful model must offer a substantive policy vision that can
galvanize as many groups of altruistic antipoverty advocates as possible
without goading them into divisive, and therefore doomed, absolutism. It must offer prospects of identifiable results that will tamp down
fatalism about poverty. At the same time, it must reduce information
costs for altruistic supporters of antipoverty programs. A successful
model will position antipoverty advocates to regularly exploit opportunities to improve those programs, such as those following Katrina,
while not giving critics obvious targets in more difficult political climates. And it must offer enough to moderate liberals and moderate
conservatives that they will expend the political capital to resist expressivists’ radicalizing pressures.
Abandoning the substantive indeterminacy of democratic experimentalism, however, does not mean that the opposite extreme—a
grand unified plan—is the answer. Each side’s dogged clinging to
one plan or another, in the absence of the sweeping political consensus needed to enact it, is much of what drove antipoverty law to its version of democratic experimentalism. Thus, as much as one might
310
wish to declare that “[t]he time to end poverty has arrived,” the political will to do so has not.
A narrower consensus is possible, however, on measures that
would make a real difference in low-income peoples’ lives. This plea
is, in essence, a call to recognize and emphasize the strand of centralized, bipartisan antipoverty policymaking that has continued in the
shadows of more prominent deliberations, most of them decentralized and experimental, about grand solutions.
This Part explores the potential for a partial but significant substantive consensus on improving antipoverty law. Section A examines
the politics of assembling such a consensus, while Section B addresses
what substantively antipoverty activists can hope to accomplish.

310

JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR
TIME 364 (2005).
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A. The Politics of a More Robust Substantive Antipoverty Consensus
Although the vast majority of federal policymaking on secondary
antipoverty programs over the past four decades has been bipartisan,
negotiations can founder unless the participants have some sense of
what the default result is likely to be in the absence of a deal. Regardless of whether action is ultimately largely partisan or fully bipartisan,
conscientious actors in both parties still need to consider how to appeal to a range of political perspectives. Even partisan proposals can
win fairly easy enactment if they avoid positions anathematic to broad
segments of the other party. This again requires disaggregating both
the Right and the Left.
Many prominent economic conservatives do not question the ba311
sic concept of public aid for low-income people.
To the contrary,
they argue that private charities cannot perform this role effectively
because of free-rider problems: the benefits of relieving poverty flow
312
to members of society whether or not they contribute.
Savvy economic conservatives also recognize that Americans’ anti-ideological
strain prevents them from seeing rigid laissez-faire doctrine as a satis313
factory justification for ignoring people in distress.
A key to enlisting their support is to design programs that minimize distortions on
the economy and on individuals’ incentives. For example, President
Bush and leading conservative Republican senators supported substantial increases in food stamps in 2002 as a means of diverting funds
314
from trade-distorting agricultural subsidies.
Likewise, fiscal conservatives should not present an insuperable
obstacle. Meaningful antipoverty initiatives are possible at costs that
are quite modest relative to the budget as a whole. Mandatory income-security programs—including some with large components not
limited to low-income people—will consume just 6.6% of federal

311

See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, supra note 301 at 109.
See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 191 (1962) (“It can be argued that private charity is insufficient because the benefits from it accrue to people
other than those who make the gifts . . . .”); see also MUELLER, supra note 235, at 47-49
(finding that voluntary associations may lead to free-riding and less than Paretooptimal redistribution).
313
See CONLAN, supra note 96, at 315 (finding that most American voters who selfidentify as being ideological conservatives are also “operational liberals” in that they
support major public programs); Super, New Moralizers, supra note 9, at 2075-76 (finding divergence between conservatives and the electorate on responding to innocent
misfortune).
314
Super, Quiet Revolution, supra note 239, at 1383 n.480.
312
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315

spending within the next decade.
Doubling these programs—far
more than is politically plausible—nonetheless would have just 63% of
316
the cost of extending President Bush’s tax cuts over this period.
Those conservatives most committed to using antipoverty law for
317
expressive purposes—the “New Moralizers” —and those seeing it as
a potential partisan wedge to split the Democratic coalition are
unlikely to join in any meaningful antipoverty initiatives. Given the
low saliency that antipoverty policy has in normal times, and the dangers those groups would face opposing initiatives in conditions like
those that followed Katrina, their reservations need not be determinative. Even as partisan a Republican as Newt Gingrich declared that
declining welfare caseloads “didn’t end poverty in America,” requiring further initiatives “to help those still left out of the American
318
dream.”
Similarly, a new antipoverty agenda could count on support from
many, but by no means all, liberals. Low-income people themselves
would naturally benefit from these initiatives. Fully engaged lowincome advocates have strong reasons to be pragmatic. Humanitarians, liberal as well as conservative, should be the core constituency for
antipoverty law. Many instrumentalists, particularly those with objections to harsher means of achieving their goals, should support antipoverty initiatives.
Highly partisan Democrats, on the other hand, are unlikely to find
an antipoverty initiative that the general public strongly supports but
that Republicans do not. Redistributionists likely could not be ac319
commodated in the same coalition with economic conservatives,
and the latter are far more numerous and important. And those liberals wishing to deliver expressive messages through antipoverty law
would bring more controversy than support. Fortunately, like conservative expressivists, such liberals have many other vehicles for achieving the symbolic statements they seek.

315

CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS
2008 TO 2018, at 52 tbl.3-1, 56 tbl.3-3 (2008).
316
Id. at 106. The cost of doubling income-support programs in the final year of
this period would consume less than forty-five percent of the cost of the expiring tax
cuts that year.
317
Super, New Moralizers, supra note 9, at 2053-57 (criticizing some expressive laws).
318
Cochran, supra note 283, at 2809.
319
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 312, at 195 (“One cannot be both an egalitarian . . .
and a [classical] liberal.”).
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Beyond maintaining significant elite support on both sides of the
ideological divide, the success of significant antipoverty initiatives depends on broad appeals to public opinion. Absent the ability to mobilize strong public support, antipoverty programs will remain vulnerable to raids for other priorities and to partisans in search of “wedge
issues,” as both occurred in the early 1980s and mid-1990s. Instrumental arguments, however, tend to be too complex to engage a distractible electorate: the information costs required to confirm or reject them are too great. Successful appeals to the public must be
humanitarian.
Such an appeal is feasible. For example, few plausible instrumental arguments exist for disaster relief—indeed, instrumental arguments will tend to favor aid to businesses in the affected region rather
than to individual disaster victims. Yet the response to Hurricane
Katrina shows that humanitarian appeals can work: the electorate had
no problem with people in New Orleans feeling a sense of entitlement
to aid from the government while in a crisis. Attempts to blame the
victims in New Orleans failed: the public was not convinced that those
not evacuating did anything wrong, and felt that even if they did this
was far more harm than most of the public was willing to see visited
upon even the “unworthy poor.” Despite widespread resistance to
providing cash assistance to low-income people, FEMA, after it was
embarrassed, announced that it would give debit cards worth $2,000
each to displaced families.
Winning and maintaining public support requires transparency.
Few voters will bear many information costs in developing antipoverty
policy. Journalistic attention to, and effectiveness in explaining, poverty issues is intermittent. Some liberal and conservative elites are
likely to criticize any initiative; if the public cannot readily judge the
merits of that criticism, it will become frozen in ambivalence. Transparency is also crucial in holding together a coalition that crosses
ideological lines: each side will show more trust if it expects that the
public would recognize any breach by the other.
The public cannot be expected to maintain continuous interest in
the way necessary to enact several successive initiatives. This counsels
in favor of designing initiatives that make sense in their own terms,
rather than small programs designed to lead to something larger.
Moreover, a constant drumbeat of stories about poverty can convince
the public that the problem is insoluble. Indeed, because many initiatives may take some time to show results, intermittent public attention
to poverty may reduce the risk of impatience. As a result, progress
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depends significantly on capturing rare moments of intense public
sympathy for low-income people to achieve major improvements.
B. Elements of a Plausible Antipoverty Consensus
Whatever the shortcomings of in-kind benefits, U.S. public opinion remains profoundly hostile to providing cash assistance under
most circumstances to most groups of low-income people. Any broad
initiatives involving cash assistance would also draw in expressivists on
both the Left and the Right, hindering pragmatic agreement. Including cash assistance programs would also eliminate any chance of drawing support from provider groups, as recipients spend cash aid on a
range of needs.
In addition, although the public would support more generous assistance than this country now offers, overbroad guarantees will draw
320
attacks for destroying work incentives and creating moral hazard.
Once the safety net gets beyond a certain point, these arguments become difficult to deflect. A new body of research suggests that families receiving somewhat more generous public benefits respond to
321
work incentives better than the absolutely destitute.
This makes
sense on several levels. Having one’s life in utter chaos can lead to
panic or depression, both of which impair rational thinking. Destitution also radically shortens an individual’s time horizon: a mother with
no way to feed her hungry children today may prefer a $4 per hour offthe-books job that pays cash right away to a permanent job paying twice
that but requiring her to wait two weeks for her first paycheck.
A key feature of a sustainable antipoverty strategy is reliance on
fewer, better programs. This feature directly opposes the instincts of
liberal experimentalists, who have sought to create numerous small
programs in the hope that some will yield sufficiently appealing results
322
to build support for more funding. Multiplying programs, however,
wreaks havoc with transparency and accountability. Senior policymakers, and the electorate, cannot tell the difference between a program that is having little impact because its funding is insufficient to
320

See Robert C. Ellickson, The Untenable Case for an Unconditional Right to Shelter, 15
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 24-27 (1992) (arguing that guaranteed shelter would
weaken work incentives and reduce aggregate social welfare).
321
See CYNTHIA MILLER, MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH CORP., EXPLAINING THE MINNESOTA FAMILY INVESTMENT PROGRAM’S IMPACTS BY HOUSING STATUS 1
(1998) (finding that almost all positive impacts of an incentive-laden welfare experiment occurred among recipients in subsidized housing).
322
Super, Political Economy, supra note 242, at 723-25.
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provide a meaningful benefit or to serve enough people, and one with
a bad design. Supporters tend to overpromise; the failure to redeem
these promises persuades the public that government cannot affect
poverty. Journalists and the public also cannot evaluate how much
help people get when numerous small programs are serving small
numbers of people; they tend to assume that all programs are available to everyone, grossly overstating the aid provided and creating the
323
sense that little more is needed.
The costs of acquiring more accurate information, though not huge, are more than most reporters or
voters will bear.
Thoughtful conservatives have long advocated for reducing the
324
number of programs as a way of minimizing administrative costs.
With resources concentrated on a few programs, those programs can
be designed as responsive entitlements (serving all eligible claimants
325
without artificial caps ) and functional entitlements (defining their
benefits in terms of the amount necessary to accomplish a particular
purpose rather than as an arbitrary sum that may not make a measurable difference and that may prove vulnerable to inflation and budget
326
cuts).
Developing common programs applicable to all low-income
people, regardless of age, health, or family arrangement, would promote simplicity, transparency, and equity. As a leading economic conservative has argued, a sound antipoverty program “should be designed to help people as people not as members of particular
327
occupational groups or age groups.”
Beyond that, the contours of a plausible antipoverty policy draw
much from the substantive component of the new governance. To retain economic conservatives’ support, antipoverty policies must mini328
329
mize market distortions by paying close attention to incentives.
This minimization can avoid much of the bureaucracy required to operate command-and-control regulation. Creating incentives also of323

See id. at 696-705 (describing problems in evaluating a program’s effectiveness).
See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 312, at 192-93 (advocating tax breaks “as a substitute for the present rag bag of measures” to reduce the total administrative burden).
325
See Super, Political Economy, supra note 242, at 654-55 (explaining responsive
entitlements).
326
See id. at 655-58 (describing functional entitlements).
327
FRIEDMAN, supra note 312, at 191.
328
Id.
329
See David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice
Model for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815, 836-44 (2004) (cataloguing the increasingly varied and complex ways in which public benefit programs manipulate
claimants’ incentives).
324
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fers a compromise on values important to one faction of the coalition
330
but disputed by others.
Thus, for example, eliminating rules that
deny or limit eligibility to married people can win broader support
than either preserving those rules or imposing explicit marriagepromotion efforts. Programs that reduce benefits too sharply as recipients’ income rises will be unsustainable.
Although the ultimate market-based form of assistance—cash—is
anathema to much of the electorate, the government’s role should be
limited to financing goods as opposed to directly purchasing or even
producing them. This will enhance support among economic conser331
vatives, expand low-income recipients’ ability to meet their preferences, and provide more effective quality control than command-andcontrol regulation. Thus, antipoverty advocates should favor programs such as food stamps, Section 8 housing vouchers, and fee-forservice Medicaid over commodity distribution, project-based Section
8, and Medicaid-managed care, which in turn are preferable to soup
kitchens, public-housing projects, and free clinics.
To secure economic conservatives’ support for a coherent system
of public benefits, liberals should be prepared to substitute transfers
332
for regulatory redistributions.
Economic conservatives attack minimum-wage laws as inefficient because they distort the market, they risk
eliminating low-skilled jobs, and their class of beneficiaries maps badly
333
onto that of low-income people.
Some minimum-wage law would
still be needed as a backstop against grossly coercive employment contracts, but liberals should be receptive to improving low-wage workers’
well-being through transfer payments rather than increases in the real
value of the minimum wage. Similarly, responding to the effects of
globalization with public benefits rather than trade limitations could
appeal to economic conservatives while targeting aid at those most in
need. The relative prevalence of regulatory redistributions at the local level gives economic conservatives an incentive to support moving
330

See id., at 842-44 (noting that moving from command-and-control rules to incentives requires accepting that some disfavored behavior will continue).
331
See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 312, at 178-80 (arguing the merits of cash grants
over public housing programs).
332
Professors Kaplow and Shavell find manipulation of legal rules inferior to transfer payments as a means of redistributing income due to one kind of underinclusiveness: the failure of any given rule to help low-income people not coming in
contact with that portion of the legal system. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 33-34 (2002). Each legal rule manipulated to this end creates
additional inefficiencies.
333
FRIEDMAN, supra note 312, at 180-81.
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the locus of antipoverty policymaking to the national level. Thus,
economic conservatives’ antipathy for local regulatory redistribution
should align their interests with those fiscally sophisticated supporters
of antipoverty programs, who recognize that affluent people’s mobility, and the cyclical vulnerability of local tax bases, are likely to doom
334
significant local transfer programs.
IV. WHITHER DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM?
Democratic experimentalism’s potential for success depends heavily on several assumptions unlikely to be met in a wide range of circumstances. Under less-than-ideal conditions, it can impede and distort public action rather than unleash and inform it. Moreover, it
remains highly vulnerable to commandeering by its philosophical opponents. Even the welfare-rights movement’s relatively brief appearance in the late 1960s transformed the norms underlying participation
in antipoverty policymaking from the deliberative ones implicit in
democratic experimentalism to those of interest-group competition.
No doubt a great deal of public-spirited deliberation has taken place
since, but from that time forth the two approaches to participation
have co-existed without clear delineation. In addition, the norm of
deliberation proved wholly insufficient to blunt the expressivist
Right’s drive to slash and dismantle antipoverty programs, both in
1981 and even more sweepingly in 1996. Whether these cuts are seen
as the result of interest-group democracy or elite decision making,
they reflect focused, centralized decisions strikingly insensitive to the
cause of fighting poverty. In 1996, deliberative, decentralized experimentalism not only failed to prevent the cuts but provided an effective political smokescreen. And in the wake of Hurricane Katrina,
its dogged indeterminacy produced a political calamity that compounded the physical one.
This Part uses antipoverty law’s experiences to seek insight into
the future of democratic experimentalism. Section A considers the
broader applicability of that experience. Section B explores options
for modifying democratic experimentalism.

334

See MUELLER, supra note 235, at 677 (noting the ultimate ineffectiveness of redistribution at a local level due to people’s ability to “vote with their feet”).
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A. The Value of the Antipoverty Law Example
The past four decades of the decentralized system for antipoverty
policy formation have been so dismal that few would want to claim
that history. Democratic experimentalists can argue legitimately that
this system did not operate in full conformity with their prescriptions:
among other things, participants on both ideological wings elevated
symbolic victories over pragmatic accomplishment. To their credit,
democratic experimentalists have recognized the 1996 welfare law’s
335
cynicism, while many others have not.
Nonetheless, when a regime espouses most of the experimentalists’ core precepts—decentralization, deregulation, deliberation, and learning from the results of local experiments—it is no
answer to say that the regime got it wrong when the experimentalists
propose no mechanism for preventing such expropriation of their
ideas or for correcting such errors. It would be anomalous for a regime defined as experimentalist to countenance only successful efforts. Experimentalists must accept and learn from failures as much
as triumphs. And with the literature dominated to date by the democratic experimentalists’ hand-picked anecdotes of promise, an analysis
of some of these techniques’ failures is crucial to assessing democratic
experimentalism’s true potential and any appropriate modifications of
its terms. Just as leading democratic experimentalists criticize institutional approaches whose “successes [a]re limited to unusual con336
texts,” their prescriptions’ value depends on their breadth and reliability of application.
Moreover, the democratic experimentalists themselves rely heavily
on examples that depart significantly from the decentralized model
they espouse. They tout drug treatment courts as a major example of
experimentalist governance, deeming them “an outgrowth of a series
of grass-roots initiatives that emphasized similarly community-based
337
team-oriented approaches.” The federal role they describe is one of
collecting and diffusing information.
Local initiatives and information sharing undoubtedly played an important role in spreading
drug-treatment courts. So, however, did some very centralized, coer-

335

Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 434-38 (calling the 1996 welfare law “the evil
twin” of positive experimentalist legislation); Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 459
(noting that the 1996 welfare law disguised what is merely a reduction in benefits as
government experimentation).
336
Dorf & Sabel, Treatment Courts, supra note 101, at 835.
337
Id. at 843.
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cive methods: a public defender in the first drug-treatment court was
the incoming President’s brother-in-law, who urged both using federal
financial leverage to establish those courts nationally and appointing
338
the first court’s founder (Janet Reno) as attorney general.
Facing
severe, chronic shortages of funds for drug-treatment programs, if the
only way a community could get federal treatment money was by starting a drug-treatment court, it is not surprising that hundreds of desperate communities did so. We will never know how communities
would have responded to a true experimentalist approach, in which
federal treatment funds were available on equal terms to communities
responding to drug abuse through other models: perhaps some of
those other models would have proven superior to drug courts.
339
Evaluating the effectiveness of these courts is also problematic; although exponents celebrate lower recidivism rates among those subjected to drug-treatment courts, the courts are designed to serve less serious offenders who would be expected to succeed more in any event.
B. The Future of Democratic Experimentalism
One possible course for the democratic experimentalists is to look
for areas of government responsibility where their implicit assumptions are met, and where key actors might be expected to support its
establishment. This would exclude “conflicts of economic interest”
and “disputes over rights arising from moral differences” but leave
some of the third area that they assert is ripe for experimentalism:
340
“the provision of public services.”
Efficient solid-waste disposal systems, for example, probably enjoy consensus support, can be measured with relative reliability, do not involve particularly time-sensitive
341
decisions, and are appropriately organized at the local level.
No
group has an obvious motive to organize a deliberative, experimentalist approach to designing such systems, but neither does

338

Mary Wisniewski, Courts Get a Fix on Drug Treatment Alternatives in Low-Level Drug
Cases, CHI. LAWYER, June 1999, at 6-7.
339
U.S. GAO, DRUG COURTS: OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, CHARACTERISTICS, AND RESULTS 8 (1997) (failing to come to any definitive conclusions on the impact of drugcourt programs).
340
Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 284.
341
Participation in deliberations about solid-waste disposal still will have significant cost. Absent a crisis, few are likely to care enough about these issues to spend
time on them. The same is likely true of most issues on which broad substantive consensus exists. On the other hand, at least persons wishing to participate in deliberations over solid-waste disposal need not acquire specialized technical knowledge.
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any have a reason to oppose them. Here, however, the new governance’s procedural side may run into conflict with its substantive component. Many of the areas in which we have consensus concerning
the nature of the problem, the importance of taking action, the measure of success, and the wisdom of decentralization are precisely those
subject to the strongest demands for privatization. Even frequent critics of privatization may not object to turning over many of these func342
tions to the private sector.
Another option would be to relax considerably democratic experimentalism’s prescriptions. A thinner democratic experimentalism—for example, one that did not disparage individual rights or confine courts to a purely procedural role—could contribute
constructively to policymaking in some environments in which the
pure version likely would misfire. Orly Lobel’s thoughtful work could
be seen as a move in this direction. Legal rules could create incentives for deliberative approaches in these areas. To some extent, administrative law already does this. Even when statutes do not require
agencies to pursue deliberative decision-making processes, they re343
ceive far more judicial deference when they do.
CONCLUSION
Contemporary debates about deliberative democracy have grappled with the very problems that democratic experimentalism assumes
away. For example, far from assuming consensus on the normative
character of policy problems and the appropriate scope of government intervention, many deliberative democrats’ major focus is on
344
how we can manage normative conflicts.
They understand that de-

342

See Super, Privatization, supra note 304, at 414-27 (objecting to privatization of
functions implicating contested normative choices and those whose performance government cannot readily monitor).
343
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (identifying a “category
of interpretive choices distinguished by an additional reason for judicial deference” as
those in which the agency used participatory decision-making procedures).
344
See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY?
10 (2004) (“The general aim of deliberative democracy is to provide the most justifiable conception for dealing with moral disagreement in politics.”); 1 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 189-93 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1981)
(describing means of finding normative commonality across cultural differences); id.
at 19 (discussing the means of converting self-interested dialogue into theoretical
normative discourse).
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345

liberation can easily polarize. They are keenly aware that “deliberation can also be used cynically . . . as a cover for the exercise of power
346
politics.”
Critics have demanded a plan for handling those “driven
347
by self-interest, blinded by prejudice, or deluded by ideology.”
More broadly, deliberative democrats argue that “substantive agreement on preferences or values is neither practically realistic nor nor348
matively appealing in a large, pluralist constituency.”
Debates on deliberative democracy have focused on the sensitivity
of reliable, transparent metrics for measuring policies’ success. Public
communication about causal mechanics may be more manipulable
349
than that about purely normative questions.
Special interests can
deceive the electorate at least as easily as their lobbyists can capture
350
public officials.
Some regard economic issues as too complex for
351
effective deliberation.
These scholars acknowledge that occasionally time will not allow
352
deliberative policymaking.
Time pressures, among other reasons,
353
can necessitate resorting to experts to clarify questions of fact. Rec-

345

See Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 175, 177
(2002) (stating that “deliberation predictably pushes groups toward a more extreme
point”).
346
GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 344, at 46.
347
James Johnson, Arguing for Deliberation: Some Skeptical Considerations, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 161, 166 ( Jon Elster ed., 1998).
348
Id. at 176; see also BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY
POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 242-44 (1984) (finding that deliberation requires commonality of norms, but placing much value on autonomy and plurality).
349
BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 195 (2004) (noting
that the average citizen may find the bureaucratic system “opaque” but still be engaged
by policy issues such as global warming); Susan C. Stokes, Pathologies of Deliberation, in
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 347, at 123, 123 (“Public communication influencing . . . causal beliefs is as important as deliberation over normative matters, and
perhaps more subject to manipulation.”).
350
Stokes, supra note 349, at 128 (“[O]rganized interests shaped citizens’ preferences over policies, and those endogenously formed policy preferences in turn caused
a shift in government policy . . . .”).
351
See Daniel A. Bell, Democratic Deliberation: The Problem of Implementation, in DELIBERATIVE POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 70, 71-72 (Stephen
Macedo ed., 1999) (“Many economic issues are so complex that it is difficult for nonexperts to contribute meaningfully to the ‘debate.’”).
352
See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 344, at 43 (“The theory of deliberative
democracy does not always in all circumstances demand the practice of deliberation.”).
353
See id. at 54 (stating that deliberative groups that “enlist experts to answer questions and clarify matters of fact” tend to be less polarizing).
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ognizing that many issues must be addressed nationally, these scholars
354
seek the means to make deliberation viable on that scale.
Acknowledging that substantial costs will deter participation, de355
liberative democrats work to minimize those costs.
They do this in
part by limiting their deliberative models to a few key issues. They are
particularly concerned with how to preserve legitimacy in light of the
gross inequalities in wealth that affect parties’ ability to bear par356
ticipatory costs.
Some scholars note other, non-economic costs to
deliberation, including stigmatization and loss of a sense of self-worth
357
in the low-income community resulting from debates on poverty.
Debates on deliberative democracy also have focused on the problem of establishing such a regime. Skeptics note that deliberative democrats assume healthy interactions without showing why those are
358
likely; advocates concede that “politicians are not automatically
transformed from representatives of special interests into trustees of
359
the public interest as a result of talking to one another.”
Awareness of these limitations has led deliberative democrats to
make less ambitious claims for their proposals’ applicability than those
the democratic experimentalists assert. They “recommend that . . .
360
not . . . every political activity itself be deliberative” and avoid “mak361
ing a black-and-white claim” about the desirability of their approach.
And in marked contrast to the democratic experimentalists, leading deliberative democrats find respect for individual rights indispensable to

354

See ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note 349, at 120 (proposing a $150 stipend to
pay citizens to participate in a national “Deliberation Day”); BARBER, supra note 348, at
245-48 (“The problem of scale is the problem of communication, and to deal with the
second is to deal with the first.”).
355
See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 344, at 31 (acknowledging that the
large number of citizens in modern democracies creates significant participation costs
in direct democracy).
356
See ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note 349, at 189-93 (explaining how the introduction of deliberative democracy would add moral weight to political outcomes that
address income distribution).
357
See Stokes, supra note 349, at 124, 134-35 (noting the effect public characterizations of welfare recipients have on the self-image of those recipients).
358
See Johnson, supra note 347, at 164 (observing that advocates of deliberative
democracy often fail to meet the exacting standards they apply to those they critique).
359
GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 344, at 11.
360
Id. at 56.
361
See ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note 349, at 192 (conceding that political outcomes addressing economic equality may have legitimizing effects for the victorious
party’s policy, but arguing that they will be more significant in a deliberative democracy).
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362

the legitimacy of deliberative democracy. In particular, they see basic
economic opportunity as a vital prerequisite to the deliberative proc363
ess.
Deliberative democrats have not found magical answers to these
364
daunting questions.
Indeed, some argue persuasively that their en365
terprise is fundamentally flawed. Nonetheless, the clarity of debates
over deliberative democracy, and their candid recognition of its limitations, could help produce a better democratic experimentalism.

362

Id. at 53, 59; BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 314-20
(1980); Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note
347, at 185, 207-21 (“The principle of deliberative inclusion extends naturally from
religious liberty to a wide guarantee of expressive liberty.”).
363
GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 344, at 142-43 (“When a political system is
structured to give rich citizens far more political power than is warranted . . . , then
deliberative processes will suffer.”); see generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS
AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 83
(William Rehg trans., 1996) (stating that “modern law is especially suited for the social
integration of economic societies”).
364
ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note 349, at 189.
365
Cf. JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 151-56 (1999) (rejecting
the idea espoused by many deliberative theorists that disagreement or lack of consensus is necessarily indicative of a failure of the deliberative system).

